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Introduction
Earnings uncertainty stemming from the labor market is one of the major risks
individuals face over their life-cycle. One can think of this risk belonging to one of
three major categories: unemployment risk, employment risk and wage risk. The
present work contributes to our understanding of these types of risk. Chapter 1 links
cross-country variations in unemployment risk to variations in regulations. Chapter 2
quantifies the amount of employment risk and wage risk present in the US. Chapter 3
analyzes the welfare consequences of asset means-testing income insurance programs.
Unemployment risk arises because household members face the possibility of
involuntary spells of non-employment. Labor demand of individual employers is
quite volatile in industrialized countries, forcing a significant fraction of workers to
leave their current employers at any period in time (see Pries and Rogerson (2005)).
This phenomenon is not limited to periods of low aggregate production, but can
be observed at each stage of the business cycle (see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)).
Likewise, personal circumstances, such as family related moves, force workers to give
up their current employment and look for a new employer at a different location.
In a Walrasian world, the Walrasian auctioneer would adjust wages to align labor
demand and supply and would match all employment seeking workers to employees
seeking firms instantaneously. The large observed worker flows would simply reflect
reallocation of labor to new matches that yield higher match surpluses. We observe;
however, workers seeking employment at the ongoing market wage, but fail to find
it, indicating the presence of frictions in the labor market. Put differently, workers
face the risk of involuntary spells without wage income. Unemployment duration is
a main determinant of the amount of unemployment risk and it varies substantial
1
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across OECD countries. Chapter 1 addresses this issue by analyzing the amount of
cross country variation that differences in product market regulation can explain
within a framework of a frictional labor market model.
Besides the risk of prolonged spells of unemployment, workers face uncertainty
about the quality of job offers they receive. All workers would work for the highest
paying employer, and employers with lower wage offers would vanish from the market
in a Walrasian labor market. It becomes optimal; however, to accept job offers below
the highest possible offer whenever the worker is faced by the trade-off of accepting
a current wage offer or staying in unemployment. The result is a distribution of
realized employer-employee matches with different employers paying different wages
to identical workers. Consequently, it becomes partially luck which type of employer
the worker encounters during his search process. To highlight that the source of this
labor market risk is employer specific, I refer to it as employment risk.
Finally, workers’ productivity and hence their earnings potential is developing in a
non-predictable manner. Health shocks that limit the ability of the worker to perform
specific tasks are a prominent example. Also, changes in demand for worker specific
skills have a stochastic component. Technological innovations make certain skills
obsolete whereas increasing the demand for other skills. A prominent example is
the increase in the college wage premium since the 1960s (see Katz and Murphy
(1992) and Autor et al. (1998)). Similarly, changing product demand, such as cyclical
variations in the construction sector, affects the labor demand for specific worker
groups. Moreover, family related circumstances may temporarily affect a worker’s
productivity. This type of risk would be present even in a non-frictional labor market
and I refer to it as wage risk. Chapter 2 starts from the observation that the variation
in wages of observationally equivalent workers is large in the US. Volker Tjaden and
I propose a model that allows us to decompose the variation into employment risk,
wage risk and measurement error and to quantify the respective contributions.
The above discussion makes apparent that labor market risk is closely linked to
the presence of frictions in the labor market. Therefore, any micro foundation of
labor market risk has to take a stance about the source of this friction. Following the
seminal work of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985), I think
of the labor market being characterized by search frictions in the first two chapters.
Workers do not know the location of each potential wage offer, but engage in a search
2
process sequentially sampling job offers by firms. Provided with a job offer, they have
to decide whether to accept it or continue searching. Likewise, firms have to search
for a suitable worker to fill a vacant job. Posting vacancies involves costs for the
firm, such as advertisement, screening and interviewing costs. Importantly, meeting
a potential partner is a probabilistic event for both sides, leading to a simultaneous
presence of unemployed workers and open vacancies in the labor market.
This framework provides my analysis with a great deal of structure. Most impor-
tantly, it allows me to address the issue of endogenous employment choices. Accepting
a job offer, quitting into unemployment and moving to a different job are all en-
dogenous choices. Therefore, data observables such as transition rates and the wage
distribution are moments resulting from non-random events. The structure provided
by the framework allows me to link the deep parameters of labor market risk to these
non-random outcomes.
Chapter 3 is different from the first two in regard that it does not explicitly
model the search friction and assumes labor market risk to be exogenous. Instead,
it addresses the issue of insurance against the risk. A large literature finds that
changes in income pass through to changes in consumption (e.g., Attanasio and Davis
(1996)). Consequently, the risk affects individual and social welfare and the question
arises how the government should provide insurance against it. In this chapter,
I follow the incomplete markets framework proposed by Bewley (1983), Huggett
(1993) and Imrohoroglu et al. (1995). Households are risk averse, but markets fail
to provide a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities, an assumption that is particularly
suited for insurance against labor market risk. The households can insure against the
labor market risk by accumulating precautionary savings and the government can
provide income transfers to households. The chapter addresses the issue whether the
government should use the amount of households’ savings to determine eligibility to
the governmental insurance programs.
Every chapter is devised as an independent, self-contained unit. The following
paragraphs preview the approach and contributions of each in some more detail and
link them back to the title of the dissertation.
Chapter 1. This chapter investigates the amount of cross country variation in
unemployment duration, the unemployment rate and average hours worked that
can be accounted for by differences in product market regulation. The analysis is
3
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motivated by two major observations. First, the unemployment rate, the average
duration of unemployment and average hours worked per worker are vastly different
across major OECD countries over long time horizons1. Second, the data suggests
that unemployment rates are positively correlated to product market regulation and
that the variation in product market regulation is large. I think of product market
regulation as entry costs into the goods market which are imposed by the government.
Using a study by Djankov et al. (2002), I document entry costs to vary from 0.44 to
8.55 of monthly per capita GDP in a sample of OECD countries.
I propose a structural model, which allows me to link product market regulation
to labor market outcomes. Unemployment arises from search frictions in the labor
market, and labor demand is driven by firms entering into a monopolistic goods
market and posting costly vacancies. When a vacant job and an unemployed worker
meet, they can decide to form a match and determine the wage by generalized
Nash-Bargaining. Firms enter whenever they see profits opportunities taking into
account the entry costs from the governmental regulation. Therefore, the product
market regulation determines the level of competition in the product market. I show
that high entry costs depress labor demand leading to longer unemployment duration,
a higher unemployment rate, lower wages and less average hours worked. Moreover, I
show that the product market regulation interacts in a meaningful way with labor
market institutions. High employment taxes and unemployment benefits amplify the
response of unemployment duration to changes in product market regulation.
To assess the quantitative relevance of the differences in product market regulation,
I calibrate the model to German labor market data, a country with relative high
product and labor market regulations. Using the model as a laboratory allows me to
quantify the changes in labor market outcomes that result from an introduction of
the low level of product market regulation present in the US. I find that wages are
predicted to increase by 1.6%, average hours worked by 1.5% and the unemployment
rate decreased by up to 0.43 percentage points. The response of unemployment would
be 50% lower when the same reduction in product market regulation would take
place in a country with the weak US labor market institutions. Consequently, the
degree of labor market institutions present in the country is a major determinant
1Apart from inflicting major costs on a country’s unemployment insurance system, the duration of
unemployment is a main determinant of the amount of unemployment risk in a country.
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for the size of the reduction in unemployment duration and unemployment risk that
governments can achieve by decreasing product market regulation.
Chapter 22. It is a well-known fact that measured wage dispersion among
observationally identical workers is large and growing over a cohort’s life-cycle. This
residual wage dispersion may either result from identical workers that are paid
differently because their employer differs (employment risk) because of stochastic
changes in unobserved worker heterogeneity (wage risk), or measurement error.
Quantifying the contribution of each driving force from wage data; however, suffers
from endogenous employment choices. Workers are more likely to accept high wage
offers when coming from unemployment and seek better paying jobs throughout
their working career. Similarly, poor shocks to individual earnings potential make
unemployment relatively more attractive leading to endogenous match separation.
Taken together, observable wage changes, transition rates and the wage distribution
are the result of an interplay of structural shocks and endogenous worker choices.
In this chapter, we build a structural model that allows us to infer from the data
observables the size of employment risk and wage risk present in US data. Hornstein
et al. (2011) show that our canonical search models can rationalize only a small
portion of the residual wage dispersion in the data as resulting from search frictions
because unemployment is not particularly painful3. Hence, using any of our canonical
search models to infer the deep parameters of the labor market leads directly to the
conclusion that employment risk must be small and measurement error must be large,
to match the large variance in residual wages, and highly persistent, to match the
increase over the life-cycle.
We circumvent the problem of implausible high and persistent measurement error
by enriching the search problem of the worker. Workers’ productivity is stochastic
and unemployed workers face skill depreciation and finite unemployment benefits.
Employed workers experience learning by doing on the job and can continue to
search for better job prospects while working. The model is able to rationalize the
large amount of residual wage dispersion and the increase over the life-cycle given
a reasonable measurement error process. We find that 17.5% of wage inequality is
explained by the presence of the search friction. Moreover, we argue that a realistic
2This chapter is joint work with Volker Tjaden.
3We use the term canonical search models here to refer to the class of search models brought
forward by McCall (1970), Mortensen (1970), Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Pissarides (1985).
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quantitative appraisal of search efficiencies needs to account for the one third of job to
job transitions resulting in wage losses. Ignoring this fact leads to an overestimation
of the contribution of the search friction by 100%, providing an explanation for earlier
findings in the literature.
Chapter 3. Whereas the first two chapters endogenize labor market risk, this
chapter takes it as exogenous and addresses the welfare implications of different
governmental insurance mechanisms. Financial markets are incomplete; therefore,
labor market risk affects households’ consumption and welfare (e.g., Attanasio and
Davis (1996)). Households can use precautionary savings against the risk and the
government can provide additional income transfers. The chapter addresses the
question whether the government should use the households’ wealth positions to
determine eligibility to the governmental transfers.
The welfare consequences of such a policy are a priori unclear. On the one hand,
for any amount of governmental expenditures, asset means-testing allows to allocate
relatively high transfers to those households which are in most need for the assistance.
On the other hand, the benefit scheme distorts saving decisions over the life-cycle and
provides incentives to hold relatively little wealth. To study the incentives created
by asset means-testing and to evaluate its welfare consequences, I introduce the
insurance scheme into an otherwise standard incomplete markets model and calibrate
the model to the current US system of income support programs.
I show that the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is higher than in the
standard incomplete markets framework and converges to it along the wealth state.
Poor households consume relatively much and this is especially true for households
with low income potential. I find that an unborn is willing to pay 0.31% of lifetime
consumption to be under a regime without any asset means-testing given the same
amount of total governmental expenditures. The main reason is that households
with low permanent income potential have strong incentives to reduce savings and
participate in the program. Average consumption of these households is higher than
the unconstrained social planner solution at early stages of their life-cycle resulting in
insufficient savings for retirement. Average consumption drops discontinuously by 3%
around retirement and keeps decreasing at a too high rate throughout the retirement
period. This failure of poor households to smooth consumption over their life-cycle
leads to welfare losses that outweigh the gains from asset means-testing.
6
Chapter1
Product Market Regulation, Labor Market
Institutions and Labor Market
Performance
1.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the role product market regulation plays in shaping differences
in unemployment and average hours worked per worker between OECD countries1.
Figure I shows the developments in unemployment rates and average hours worked
per worker in 5 major OECD countries since the mid-80s. The figure highlights that
countries like Germany and Sweden experienced persistent high unemployment rates
and low amounts of average hours worked. At the same time, The UK and US faced
much lower unemployment rates and workers worked more hours on average.
A growing literature investigates the role product market regulation (PMR) plays
in shaping these patterns. The results; however, are inconclusive so far. Empirical
work by Boeri et al. (2000), Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), Lopez-Garcia (2003)
and Griffith et al. (2007) finds a positive partial correlation between PMR and
unemployment rates. But, structural models by Ebell and Haefke (2009) and Fang
and Rogerson (2011) indicate a negligible role2.
The main contribution of this chapter is the following: I demonstrate that the
quantitative response of the unemployment rate to a change in PMR depends on
1Layard et al. (1991) show that cross sectional differences in unemployment rates can mostly be
explained by differences in unemployment duration.
2Earlier contributions on the effect of PMR on unemployment include Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) and Spector (2004).
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Figure I: Unemployment and Hours Worked in the OECD
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Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics
the strength of labor market institutions (LMIs). I use a labor market model
with search and matching frictions that explains differences in the unemployment
rate by differences in mean unemployment duration. I think of PMR as costs that
entrepreneurs have to pay when entering into a monopolistic goods market. Decreasing
these costs leads to vacancy creation, which triggers additional labor demand. The
economy reaches a new equilibrium either by an increase in wages or by increases
in the search costs for new employees, which I model as a decreasing function of
unemployment duration. The response of unemployment is small whenever the
equilibrium adjustment occurs mostly by an adjustment in wages. The relative
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response of wages and search costs depends on the marginal value of an additional
worker to the firm. When this value is small, the extra value created by deregulation
is large relative to the existing marginal value, and relatively many firms enter into the
product market and create vacancies3. I demonstrate that LMIs and PMR interact by
two major channels that alter the relative response of wages and search costs. First,
strong labor market institutions imply that a relatively small share of the profits
generated from the product market goes to the firms, making the marginal value
of a worker small. Second, strong labor market institutions decrease firms’ profits,
which leads to higher mark-ups in equilibrium for a given level of product market
regulation. The higher mark-ups decrease the marginal revenue product of labor and
hence decrease the equilibrium marginal value of an extra employer to the firm even
further.
The quantitative response of unemployment also depends on the design of unem-
ployment benefits. The response of unemployment is relatively weak when benefits are
modeled as replacement rates. The reason is that deregulations in the product market
trigger increases in wages, which increases unemployment benefits and counteracts
the decrease in unemployment. The response of unemployment is much stronger
when benefits stay constant. I additionally incorporate an intensive labor supply
margin into the structural model; thus, allowing me to study the effects of PMR on
the intensive labor supply margin within a frictional labor market context. PMR
reduces the time a worker allocates to market work because it decreases wages4.
My work is most closely related to Ebell and Haefke (2009), who use a model with
search and matching frictions in the labor market and bargaining between firms and
workers over wages. The authors calibrate the model to US data following closely the
calibration strategy of Shimer (2005). They show that PMR has a negligible effect
on unemployment under these specifications. I calibrate my model to German data,
which exhibits much stronger LMIs. Depending on the specification of unemployment
benefits, a decrease in PMR from German to US level decreases the structural
unemployment rate in a range from 0.1 to 0.432 percentage points in my model
economy. The effect is by a factor of 2.7 larger than the one Ebell and Haefke (2009)
3See Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Hornstein et al. (2005) for a similar argument with
respect to the relative response of unemployment and wages to productivity shocks.
4The effect depends on the relative strength of the income and substitution effect. In my utility
specification, the income effect dominates.
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find for a similar large deregulation in the US.
The chapter is also related to the literature that tries to understand responses at
the intensive margin to changes in institutions. Prescott (2004) and Ohanian et al.
(2008) examine the response of hours worked on employment taxes in a neoclassical
growth model. They argue that differences between countries in employment taxes
can explain most of the difference in observed hours worked. Shi and Wen (1999) and
Krusell et al. (2010) incorporate the intensive margin into a search and matching
model and generally find large employment responses to tax changes, too. I find
differences in PMR explaining some of the cross country variation. Decreasing PMR
from the German to the US level can account for up to 1.66% of differences in averaged
hours worked. Consistent with the previous evidence, most differences are explained
by differences in LMIs, especially in the tax code.
The chapter is structured as follows: The next section highlights some stylized
facts about PMR and LMIs in five major OECD countries. Thereafter, I develop my
model, characterize the equilibrium and explain the mechanisms at work. I calibrate
the model to German data and perform the policy experiments. The last section
concludes.
1.2 Institutions in OECD Countries
This section presents several stylized facts about institutional differences for a
sample of OECD countries. I consider the year 1997, for which detailed data on both
LMIs and PMR exists5. To explain the large differences in labor market outcomes
outlined above, one would expect institutions to have an economically significant size
and to substantially vary between countries. This section provides estimates that
verify these claims.
Looking at LMIs, my analysis focuses on cross country differences in employment
taxes and replacement rates. Table 1.1 shows the substantial variation of these two
measures across countries. Average gross replacement rates range from 13.9% in the
US to 26.9% in Sweden. Similarly, employment taxes range from a low of 23.2% in the
US to 44.4% in Sweden. There is a strong positive correlation between replacement
5Institutions are quite stable over longer time horizons. For example, replacement rates were the
highest in Germany and Sweden throughout the sample period (see Nickell (2006)).
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Table 1.1: Labor Market Institutions in the OECD
Country Replacement rate % Employment taxes %
Germany 25.7 42.6
Italy 18 42.2
Sweden 26.9 44.6
UK 18.3 25.9
US 13.9 23.2
Notes: Replacement rates correspond to the OECD gross replacement rates. Employ-
ment taxes include direct taxes and social security contributions.
Source: Nickell (2006) and McDaniel (2007)
rates and employment taxes, with Italy being the exception.
Table 1.2 summarizes the costs of entering into the product market. Djankov et al.
(2002) report for my sample of countries the amount of business days required to
start a medium size firm6 and the costs for required fees, measured in percentage of
yearly per capita GDP. The table shows that entering the product market is possible
on short notice and the required costs for fees are low in Sweden, UK and the US. At
the same time, Germany and Italy substantially delay business operation and it is
costly to meet all legal obligations.
1.3 The Model
This section incorporates the above mentioned regulations into a model with a labor
marker that is characterized by search and matching frictions and a monopolistic
goods market. I begin by describing the household and firm problem and derive
optimal policies. Using these policies, I characterize the equilibrium in the labor
market for an exogenous competition level in the goods market. Afterwards, I
endogenize the competition level in the goods market and relate it to the level of
product market regulation.
6Besides some requirements on capital, they define a medium size firm to have between 5 − 50
employees.
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Table 1.2: Entry Costs in the OECD
Country Lost business days Procedural costs
Germany 90 0.085
Italy 121 0.2474
Sweden 17 0.0254
UK 11 0.0056
US 7 0.01
Notes: The second column shows the amount of days it takes to set up a
medium size firm. The third column reports the amount of spending required
to fulfill all legal obligations that are invoked with setting up a medium size
firm. The latter is measured in yearly per capita GDP.
Source: Djankov et al. (2002)
1.3.1 Households and the Labor Market
There is a continuum of infinitely lived individuals uniformly distributed on the
unit interval, who either work in period t, nt, or are unemployed, ut, and earn the
amount of unemployment benefits b. Therefore, I have
1 = ut + nt.
I make the simplifying assumption that workers can unilaterally choose the fraction of
time they wants to work, ht, from the unit interval. Following Merz (1995), I assume
that each individual belongs to a larger household where all labor and unemployment
income is pooled and equally split. The consumption and hours worked decision is
made at the household level and individuals face no idiosyncratic risk from the labor
market. Search is random and the labor market is governed by a matching function
mt = ξuιtv1−ιt where vt are the total amount of vacancies posted by firms. Defining
labor market tightness as θt = vtut , I can write the vacancy filling rate and job finding
rate respectively as:
mt(vt, ut)
vt
= ξθ−ιt ≡ q(θt)
mt(vt, ut)
ut
= ξθ1−ιt = θtq(θt) ≡ p(θt).
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Let wt be the gross wage a household earns for each employed member that devotes
a full a unit of time to working. Each worker faces an exogenous match separation
rate, occurring at Poisson rate ω. Moreover, firms exit the market at exogenous
Poisson rate δ. The worker joins the pool of unemployment in both cases; therefore,
he only cares about the total job separation rate: χ = 1 − (1 − ω)(1 − δ). The
household maximizes his life time utility by choosing the amount of consumption and
hours worked by each employed member, taking the unemployment rate, the gross
wage, the job finding rate and the laws of motion of the state variables as given. The
maximization problem of the representative household reads:
max
ct,ht
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ct + κ[ln(1− ht) + ht]
]}
(1.1)
s.t.
ct = utb+ wthtnt(1− τ)
ut+1 = χnt + (1− p(θt))ut
ct ≥ 0
ht ∈ [0, 1]
{ut, wt, nt, θt} given.
β is a discount factor, κ is a scaling parameter for the disutility of work and τ is
the employment tax. I assume that the government uses tax revenue to purchase
public goods that do not enter the utility of households. The functional form ensures
an interior solution for the hours choice because
lim
h→0
g′(h) = 0, lim
h→1
g′(h) = −∞.
The first order conditions of household optimization yield an implicit solution for
hours worked that is increasing in the wage7:
1
1− ht − 1 =
wtnt(1− τ)
κ
. (1.2)
I assume that aggregate consumption composites of m goods, each having substi-
7I want to stress gain that this results from utility being linear in consumption.
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tution elasticity σ:
ct =
[ m∑
i=1
c
σ−1
σ
i,t
] σ
σ−1
.
Each good i is produced by a separate firm leading to the individual product
demand curve:
Y Di,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−σ
ct,
where Pi,t is the price firm i sets and Pt is the aggregate price level.
The sequence problem (1.1) satisfies Bellman’s principle of optimality; consequently,
I can write it recursively. I define separately the value of an employed household
member, V E, and an unemployed member, V U :
V E = wh(1− τ) + κ[ln(1− h) + h] + β[(1− χ)V E′ + χV U ′ ]
V U = b+ β[(1− p(θ))V U ′ + p(θ)V E′ ],
where primes denote next period’s values.
1.3.2 The Firm’s Problem
Each firm i decides how many vacancies vt to post in period t with associated costs
ϕ and how much labor to hire in t+ 1 taking as given the labor supply decision of
the workers, the vacancy filling rate and its individual demand function:
V J(ni) = max
n′,v
{
Pi(yi)
P
yi − wnih− ϕvi + β(1− δ)V J(n′i)
}
(1.3)
s.t.
yi = Anih[
yi
c
]− 1
σ
= Pi
P
n′i = (1− ω)ni + q(θ)vi.
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The first order condition with respect to vacancies yields
∂V J(n′i)
∂n′i
= ϕ
q(θ)
1
β(1− δ) , (1.4)
which is constant. The marginal contribution of an additional worker in the next
period must equal the costs of searching for her, weighted by the discount rate and
the probability of firm survival. The envelope condition of employment reads:
∂V J(ni)
∂ni
= σ − 1
σ
Pi
P
Ah︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRPLi
−wih− ∂wi
∂ni
hni +
ϕ
q(θ)(1− ω). (1.5)
The value of an extra employee in the optimum is its marginal revenue product of
labor minus the wage costs plus the search costs that would have occurred next period,
if the worker had not been hired. The total wage cost from hiring an additional
worker has two components. First, the firm needs to pay the additional worker the
wage wih. Second, adding an additional worker decreases the average wage because
MRPL decreases when employment increases. MRPL consists of the inverse of the
mark-up a monopolistically firm sets. A higher σ increases MRPL because adding
an additional worker has less detrimental effects on individual product demand. σ is
a preference parameter and as σ →∞ the mark-up goes to zero. I follow Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) and Ebell and Haefke (2009) and interpret it from now on as
the level of competition in the goods market. The interpretation is a natural one
because higher competition implies a higher product variety, which increases the
substitutability of each product.
Shifting the expression one period forward and setting it equal to (1.4) gives the
optimal intertemporal firm policy:
ϕ
q(θ) = (1− δ)β[MRPL
′
i − w′ih′ −
∂w′
∂n′
h′n′i +
ϕ
q(θ′)(1− ω)]. (1.6)
ϕ
q(θ) are the marginal costs of an extra hire, which are increasing in labor market
tightness. Optimality requires that these costs must equal the value of an additional
worker to the firm in the next period, weighted by the discount factor and firm
survival.
Figure II plots the change in firms’ labor demand as a reaction to a change
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in competition keeping labor supply and prices fixed. When competition increases,
meaning σ increases, MRPL increases because a firm’s product demand is less affected
by changes in its output. This in turn leads firms to increase vacancy posting. (1.6)
shows that factors decreasing the wage have the same effect on vacancy posting.
Figure II: Firm Equilibrium
5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6 6.2
1
2
3
x 10−3
v
σ
 
 
0.135
0.14
0.145
M
R
PL
v
MRPL
Notes: The figure displays the equilibrium changes in marginal revenue product of
labor, MRPL, and the firm reaction in vacancy posting, v, to exogenous variations
in the competition level, σ.
1.3.3 Wage Determination
Once a worker is matched to a firm, the two engage in generalized Nash-Bargaining
over the wage:
max
w
{
Ω = Ωw + (1− )Ωfi
}
, (1.7)
where Ωw and Ωfi is the log of match surplus of the individual worker and the
individual firm, respectively, and  is the bargaining power of workers. The match
surplus for the worker is:
V W = V E − V U = wh(1− τ)− b+ κ[ln(1− h) + h] + β(1− χ− p(θ))V W ′ . (1.8)
The match surplus for the firm is to produce with one more worker, which is given
by (1.5). Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996), the solution can be characterized by:
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Lemma 1. Firm’s labor demand is given by:
ϕ
q(θ) = (1− δ)β
[
MRPL′i
σ
σ −  − w
′
ih
′ + ϕ
q(θ′)(1− ω)
]
. (1.9)
The wage curve is given by:
wi =

h
[
σ
σ − MRPLi +
ϕ
1− δ θ
]
− 1− (1− τ)h
[
κ[ln(1− h) + h]− b
]
. (1.10)
Worker’s match surplus takes the form:
V W = wh− b+ κ[ln(1− h) + h] + β[1− χ− p(θ)] 1− (1− τ)
ϕ
q(θ)
1
β(1− δ) . (1.11)
Proof: See Appendix 1.A.
The system of equations describes the dynamic equilibrium behavior for any level of
product market competition. (1.9) determines the amount of firms’ vacancy posting,
given the level of product market competition, the household’s hours choice and
the level of unemployment. Household’s hours choice follows from (1.2), and the
unemployment rate follows from the law of motion for unemployment. Given the
resulting labor market tightness, (1.10) characterize equilibrium wages.
1.3.4 Steady State Short-Run General Equilibrium
This section characterizes equilibrium wages and labor market tightness in the
steady state for a given competition level and given parameters. Equilibrium implies
that Pi
P
= 1 because firms’ production technologies are symmetric. Therefore, (1.9)
simplifies in steady state to
ϕ
q(θ) = (1− δ)β
[
Ah
σ − 1
σ
σ
σ −  − wh+
ϕ
q(θ)(1− ω)
]
.
Together with (1.10), I arrive at two equations determining θ and w:
σ − 1
σ
σ
σ − Ah =
1
1− 
ϕ
q(θ)
1
1− δ
[ 1
β
− 1 + χ+ p(θ)
]
− 11− τ
[
κ[ln(1− h) + h]− b
]
(1.12)
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w = 
h
ϕ
q(θ)
1
1− δ
1
1− 
[ 1
β
− 1 + χ+ p(θ)
]
− 1(1− τ)h
[
κ[ln(1− h) + h]− b
]
. (1.13)
Aggregate output is given by Y = Anh, and the steady state unemployment rate
balances in and outflows leading to the familiar Beveridge curve:
u = χ
χ+ p(θ) . (1.14)
Figure III visualize the role the competition level plays in the short-run equilibrium.
An increase in σ increases labor market tightness according to (1.12). The quantitative
increase from 0.04 to 0.19 is quite sizable. According to (1.14), unemployment falls
from 16% to 7.5%. The increase in θ increases the position of the workers in the
Nash-Bargaining and increases wages according to (1.13). The first order conditions
of workers, (1.2), shows that this increase translates into a higher labor supply of
workers.
Figure III: Short-Run Equilibrium
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(B) Wages and Labor Supply
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Notes: The figure displays the labor market equilibrium for exogenous variations in competition, σ. The
left panel displays on the left axis the equilibrium levels of labor market tightness and on the right axis the
resulting unemployment rate. The right panel shows on the left axis the equilibrium schedule for wages and
on the right axis the hours worked per employed.
1.3.5 Entry into the Goods Market
This section endogenizes the equilibrium level of competition and links it to PMR.
Firms enter the market until profits are driven down to zero, which determines the
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equilibrium competition levels. Firms find it optimal to hire the steady optimal level
of labor already in the first period since vacancy posting costs are linear. Therefore,
the steady state value of the firm must equal the entry costs plus the costs of hiring
the steady state work force. I construct the entry costs following Ebell and Haefke
(2009). Djankov et al. (2002) measure the resource costs that entrepreneurs incur
when starting a firm in the year 1997. These compose of costs for fees and the amount
of business days lost until the firm can start operating. I evaluate the latter at the
loss of per capita income per working day. Let total entry costs be denoted by Γ:
Γ = (d+ γ)Y,
where d is the regulatory delay in months, γ are the fees as percentage of per capita
GDP and Y is aggregate income. The free entry condition reads:
Γ(σ) + ϕ
q(θ(σ))n(σ) = V
J(σ). (1.15)
The equation uniquely determines σ. The transition to the long-run equilibrium
works through the adjustment of θ and w. To see this point, assume an increase in
the regulation costs. Figure IVA displays this scenario. The right hand side of (1.15)
becomes larger as σ decreases. The old and new long-run equilibriums are given by
(A) Long-Run Equilibrium
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Notes: Panel A plots the long-run equilibrium. The dotted line is the value of the firm for a given level
of σ, the straight line shows the entry costs under low regulation and the dashed line the corresponding
costs under high regulation. Panel B displays the relative changes of wages and labor market tightness for
variations in the competition level. One calibration is done for a country with German LMIs and one for a
country with US LMIs.
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the interception of the dashed and straight line with the line depicting the value of
the firm. Higher entry costs lead to a higher value of the firm and a lower competition
level. The reason is that an increase in entry costs requires that either the costs of
hiring the steady state work force decrease, or the value of the firm increases. Both
margins adjust in equilibrium. Recall from (1.12) that a decrease in σ lowers θ. The
lower θ increases the vacancy contact rate, reducing the costs of hiring the steady
state work force. As a result, the second term on the left hand side of (1.15) becomes
smaller. Figure IVA shows; however, that this fact is dominated by the increase in
the costs. Therefore, the value of the firm needs to increase additionally. The increase
is obtained by adjustment at two margins. First, the lower θ makes the replacement
hiring in the future cheaper. Second, wages decrease because the relative position of
the firm in the Nash-Bargaining improves, which increases future profit streams.
The discussion makes apparent that the quantitative response of unemployment to
a deregulation in the product market depends on the relative response of wages and
labor market tightness. The response of unemployment to a deregulation is weak,
when mostly wages increase to achieve the necessary decrease in V J8. This point
leads me to the evaluation of sizable interaction effects between PMR and LMIs.
Define xˆ to denote dln(x) and define the flow match surplus as
MS = σ − 1
σ − Ah+
1
1− τ
[
κ[ln(1− h) + h]− b
]
.
I can approximate the effect of changes in h and σ on θ using (1.12):
θˆ =
1
β
− 1 + χ+ p(θ)
p(θ) + ι[ 1
β
− 1 + χ]
[ σ(1−)
(σ−)2Ah
MS
σˆ +
σ−1
σ−Ah+
κ
1−τ [h− h1−h ]
MS
hˆ
]
. (1.16)
The equation emphasizes the two channels through which labor market institutions
and product market regulation interact. First, strong labor market institutions
decrease the flow surplus, leading to a larger quantitative response in θ to a change
in σ. A low flow match surplus implies that the changes in profits generated by
changes in product market regulation are large relative to the marginal match surplus.
Hence, firms adjust vacancy creation strongly to fulfill the free entry condition (1.15).
Second, (1.13) implies that equilibrium wages are higher in a country with strong
8See Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Hornstein et al. (2005) for a similar argument for the
canonical search and matching model in the case of shocks to productivity.
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labor market institutions. The higher wages, in turn, decrease firms’ profits. As a
result, the free entry condition implies higher mark-ups in countries with strong LMIs.
To understand the implication for the response of unemployment to product market
regulation, note that for the cross partial derivative holds
∂θˆ
∂σˆ∂σ
< 0. (1.17)
Changes in the competition level translate stronger into changes in labor market
tightness when the original competition level was low. The intuition is that the higher
equilibrium mark-ups in a country with strong LMIs imply a relative low marginal
revenue product of labor because individual product demand is relatively steep.
Therefore, the equilibrium marginal value of an extra employer and match surplus
are lower. Figure IVB visualizes these effects. It plots the percentage change in labor
market tightness relative to wages ( δ%θ
δ%w ) that results from exogenously varying σ for
two scenarios. The straight line represents a country with German LMIs and the
dashed line a country with the US LMIs. For a given change in competition, the
percentage change in labor market tightness relative to wages is much higher in the
former case, making the effects of PMR on unemployment duration relatively more
severe in countries with strong LMIs.
To understand how changes in labor market tightness translate into changes in the
unemployment rate, note that an approximation to (1.14) gives a one-to-one mapping
between these variables that depends on the matching elasticity:
uˆ = −(1− ι)(1− u)θˆ. (1.18)
1.4 Calibration
I calibrate the model to match German labor market statistics. I assign values
to the policy parameters from the year 1997 because the most detailed product
market regulation data is available for that year. The recession during the mid-90s
makes the year 1997 arguably not a steady state. Therefore, I obtain data from
averages over longer time horizons for all other calibration targets. The model period
is one month. In calibrating the model, I mostly follow the strategy proposed by
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Shimer (2005), opposed to the small surplus calibration proposed by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). Costain and Reiter (2008) show that the latter implies an elasticity
of unemployment to changes in unemployment benefits that is six to 60 times larger
than available estimates. (1.16) highlights that a small surplus, MS, has a similar
effect on propagation from changes in σ. Moreover, my focus is on differences between
countries and the qualitative effects are the same across the two calibration strategies.
Table 1.3 summarizes all calibration parameters.
Note that the equilibrium system of equations is homogeneous of degree one in
aggregate productivity. I therefore normalize A = 1. Consistent with Siegel (2002),
my choice of β implies a yearly real interest rate of 4%. The scaling parameter for the
disutility of work is set such that an employed worker devotes 17% of his available
time to market work, which is the implied value from the OECD German hours
worked series.
I follow Mortensen and Nágipal (2007) and identify the elasticity of the matching
function using the Beveridge curve and the cyclical component of unemployment and
vacancies. I obtain quarterly vacancy and unemployment data from the Forschungs-
datenzentrum der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (German Bureau of Labor (IAB)) for
the period of 1978− 20049. I detrend the data using a HP-filter with a smoothing
parameter λ = 105. An OLS regression of log vacancies on log unemployment yields
a regression coefficient of −1.5. The Beveridge curve implies that
ln(ξ) + ιln(ut) + (1− ι)ln(vt) = ln(χ) + ln(1− ut).
Rewriting the relation and taking the derivative with respect to log vacancies yields
∂ln(vt)
∂ln(ut)
= − 11− ι
[
ut
1− ut + ι
]
. (1.19)
The average HP-filtered unemployment rate over the time horizon is u = 0.078.
With ∂ln(v)
∂ln(u) = −1.5 I obtain ι = 0.57. The approach requires that the economy is
in steady state each quarter, which might be a poor approximation for the German
labor market. The estimate is close; however, to available evidence from studies that
use empirical specifications of the matching function with German data. Burda and
9The vacancy data uses reported job openings to the federal agency. There is no requirement for
firms to report any open vacancy; thus, the measured level of vacancies is likely to be too low.
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Table 1.3: Calibration
Variable Target
β = 0.9967 4% annual real interest rate
κ = 0.6635 h = 0.169
A = 1 Normalization
ι = 0.57 Equation (1.19)= −1.5
 = 0.57 Hosios condition
ξ = 0.0468 u = 0.078
ϕ = 0.084 θ = 0.14
δ = 0.007% Plant exit probability
ω = 0.163% EU = 0.17%
b = 0.0418 b
wh
= 25.7%
τ = 0.426 McDaniel (2007)
d = 4.154 Djankov et al. (2002)
γ = 1.021 Djankov et al. (2002)
Notes: The left column states the calibrated variable with its value and
the second states the targeted moment or the source. EU stands for the
employment to unemployment transition probability.
Wyplosz (1994) obtain ι = 0.7 for the period of 1968 − 1991. Gross (1997) finds
ι = 0.55 for 1972− 1983 and 0.37 for 1984− 1994. Finally, Fahr and Sunde (2004)
suggest ι = 0.48 for the period of 1980− 1994. To understand the implications for
the choice of ι, recall from (1.18) that a high ι implies a relatively weak response of
unemployment to changes in the institutional structure. I follow Shimer (2005) and
impose the Hosios condition  = ι10.
I use the scaling efficiency of the matching function to calibrate the unemployment
rate to 0.078. I set ϕ = 0.084 implying a labor market tightness of 0.14, which is
the average in Germany for 1978 − 2004. With regard to transition parameters, I
measure from IAB plant level data the fraction of employment that is lost due to
plant exit during the period of 1985− 2004, which leads to δ = 0.00007. I decide to
calibrate the job separation rate from the perspective of the worker. Jung and Kuhn
10Increasing workers’ bargaining power would reduce marginal match surplus further, leading to
stronger responses in unemployment. Again, cross country differences are unaffected by my
choice and imposing the Hosios condition is attractive because it can be rationalized from a
directed search perspective where firms post vacancies in sub-markets (see Shi (2006)).
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(2011) report a mean employment to unemployment (EU) transition probability of
0.17% between 1980− 2004, implying ω = 0.00163.
My choices for the policy parameters follow Section 1.2. I set b such that the
replacement rate is 25% of nominal wages, and employment taxes are another 42.6%.
Djankov et al. (2002) report that 90 business days are lost in Germany when setting-
up a medium size firm. I translate this into a monthly cost by assuming 260 working
days per year, leading to d = 4.154. Finally, I set γ = 1.021 implying that regulatory
fees cost 8.5% of yearly per capita GDP.
1.5 Out of Sample Predictions
Table 1.4: Predictions from the Calibration
Germany Italy Sweden UK US
u% 7.8 5.74 9.0 4.6 4.2
h 0.169 0.17 0.165 0.216 0.221
Notes: The table shows predictions of unemployment and the fraction of time an em-
ployed worker devotes to labor market activities for different countries based on a cali-
bration that targets labor market moments in Germany.
I judge the ability of the structural model to pick up the main institutional
mechanisms using the heterogeneity in institutions and labor market outcomes in
the cross section of countries. I vary the institutional parameters according to
Section 1.2 and assume that all preference and technology parameters are constant
across countries. Table 1.4 displays the predicted unemployment rate and the hours
decision for the countries under consideration. The model predicts Sweden to have a
higher unemployment rate than Germany and the UK and US to have considerably
lower rates, which is in line with the data. The main failure of the model is the too
low prediction for the unemployment rate in Italy11. With regard to the intensive
margin, the model predicts correctly that Swedish and German workers devote almost
the same amount of time to market work, whereas hours worked per worker is higher
11The unemployment rate in Italy varies considerably within the country, especially it is considerably
higher in southern Italy.
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in the UK and US. Again, the model predicts Italian workers to work relatively too
little in the market. Nevertheless, I take these results as encouraging that the model
is able to predict key labor market moments from the data.
1.6 Results
This section presents the main results of this chapter. To help focusing, I demon-
strate the effects of changes in regulations using the example of German and US
LMIs and PMR. I begin by demonstrating the effect of a product market deregulation
on mark-ups and wages. Afterwards, I address the resulting changes in employment
outcomes.
1.6.1 PMR, Mark-Ups and Wages
Comparing rows one and three in Table 1.5 shows that high labor market regulation
increases wages and mark-ups. The increase in wages directly follows from (1.13)
because the bargaining position of workers increases. The increase in wages decreases
firms’ profits. Mark-ups have to increase, for firms to fulfill the free entry condition
(1.15). Recall from (1.17) that this difference affects the way that changes in the
competition level translate into changes in labor market outcomes.
The top panel of Table 1.5 presents the predicted change in mark-ups and wages
after a deregulation of the product market from the German to the US level in
Table 1.5: Changes in the Mark-Ups and Wages
σ−
σ−1 w
German LMIs German PMR 1.0215 0.9617
US PMR 1.0051 0.9775
US LMIs German PMR 1.0191 0.9498
US PMR 1.0028 0.9656
Notes: The table displays the changes in the mark-ups and gross wages as a re-
action to a decrease in PMR from the German to the US level. The reform is
considered for a country with German and US LMIs separately.
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a country with the high German LMIs. Mark-ups fall by 1.64 percentage points,
triggering an increase in wages of about 1.63%. Rows three and four show the effects,
when the same reform is implemented in a country with the low US LMIs. The
quantitative effects turn out to be very similar to the former case. Mark-ups fall
by 1.63 percentage points and wages rise by 1.66%. The slightly stronger reaction
of wages in a country with low LMIs is in line with empirical evidence provided by
Griffith et al. (2007). The decrease in mark-ups is quite sizable under both scenarios.
Mark-ups decrease close to zero under US PMR indicating that the US level creates
almost no costs in form of monopoly power12.
1.6.2 PMR and Employment Decisions
I now demonstrate how deregulation in the product market translates into quan-
titative changes at the extensive and intensive employment margin. I discuss two
different policy regimes with respect to the treatment of unemployment benefits.
First, I look at an endogenous b that reacts to the deregulation of the product market
keeping the replacement rate constant. Thereafter, I discuss the case with a fixed b.
The top panel of Table 1.6 shows the effect of changes on PMR on employment
choices in my baseline model with a constant replacement rate. The effect of a
decrease in PMR on unemployment is almost twice as large in a country with German
LMIs compared to a country with US LMIs. Thus, the propagation mechanisms
analyzed in Section 1.3.5 lead to large quantitative differences between countries. The
quantitative response of unemployment is; however, small overall in both cases with
my calibration. The increase at the intensive margin is somewhat larger. h increases
by 1.48% in the case of German LMIs and by 1.33% in the case of US LMIs.
Table 1.5 highlights that wages increase after a deregulation in the product market;
therefore, b increases to keep the replacement rate constant, which counteracts the
decrease in u. Expected benefits from unemployment are; however, seldom perfectly
indexed to the wage in OECD countries because social assistance is usually not
indexed to wages. The bottom panel of Table 1.6 demonstrates that the extensive
margin reacts much stronger to changes in PMR when b is kept constant. In this
case, the unemployment rate is predicted to decrease by 0.432 percentage points with
12Part of the explanation is that firms incorporate the effect that hiring additional workers has on
the average wage bill. Mark-ups would be σσ−1 >
σ−
σ−1 without this effect.
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Table 1.6: Changes in Employment Decisions
u% h
b as a replacement rate
German LMIs German PMR 7.8 0.169
US PMR 7.7 0.1715
US LMIs German PMR 4.258 0.2182
US PMR 4.202 0.2211
b fixed
German LMIs German PMR 7.8 0.169
US PMR 7.368 0.1718
US LMIs German PMR 4.258 0.2182
US PMR 4.177 0.2211
Notes: The table displays the changes at the employment margin as a reaction to a decrease in
PMR from the German to the US level. The reform is considered for a country with German
and US LMIs separately. In the top panel, b is adjusted after the reform to keep a constant
replacement rate. In the bottom panel, b is kept constant.
German LMIs and 0.081 percentage points with US LMIs. Thus, in case the size
of unemployment benefits does not depend on changes in wages, PMR can have a
significant effect on unemployment rates in countries with strong LMIs.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the role PMR plays in explaining differences in average
unemployment duration, unemployment rates and hours worked between OECD
countries. I put special emphasis on the interaction effects between PMR and LMIs.
PRM increases the costs of entry into a monopolistic product market; thus, increasing
the mark-ups of firms. To keep firms willing to enter the product market, wages have
to decrease and unemployment has to increase. I show that the relative response of
wages and unemployment to a deregulation in the product market depends on the
strength of labor market institutions. Strong LMIs decrease the value of an additional
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worker to the firm by two distinct channels. First, there is a direct effect because
they raise the relative value of unemployment. Second, there is an indirect effect. I
show that strong LMIs lead to lower equilibrium competition in the product market.
The low level of competition decreases the marginal revenue product of labor to firms
and hence decreases the value of an additional worker. When this value is small,
the extra value created by deregulation in the product market is large relative to
the existing marginal value of an additional worker and relatively many firms enter
creating relatively high additional labor demand.
I quantify the effect of PMR on unemployment and average hours worked by
calibrating my model to German data. Decreasing the level of PMR present in
Germany in 1997 to the corresponding US level had the potential to decrease the
German unemployment rate by 0.432 percentage points, if the level of unemployment
benefits would be kept constant. This effect is 2.7 times larger than previous studies
suggest. The key driving force is a low marginal value of an additional worker in
Germany, which increases the response of unemployment by 100% relative to a country
with US LMIs. Moreover, workers can expect wages to rise by 1.63%, which triggers
an increase at the intensive labor supply margin of about 1.66%.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A Proof of Lemma 1
Differentiating (1.7) yields
wi =

h
[
MRPLi − ∂wi
∂ni
hni +
ϕ
q(θ)(1− ω)
]
− 1− (1− τ)h
[
− b+ κ[ln(1− h) + h] + β(1− χ− p(θ))V W ′
]
. (1.20)
Ignoring constant parts, for the moment, I have:
w = 
h
[
MRPLi − ∂wi
∂ni
hni
]
. (1.21)
Assume the differential equation has a solution to the homogeneous part, and let Z
be the corresponding integration constant. Then the solution takes the form
wi = Zn
− 1

i (1.22)
∂wi
∂ni
= −1

Zn−
1+
 + ∂Z
∂ni
n
− 1

i . (1.23)
Plugging (1.22) and (1.23) into the differential equation (1.21) and substituting for
MRPLi yields:
∂Z
∂ni
= 1
h
σ − 1
σ
Ah
[
Ah
c
]− 1
σ
n
σ−σ−
σ
i .
Integrating with respect to ni with integration constant X yields:
Z = 1
h
σ − 1
σ
Ah
[
Ah
c
]− 1
σ σ
σ − n
σ−
σ
i +X.
Plugging into (1.22) gives
wi =

h
σ
σ − MRPLi +Xn
− 1

i .
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To uniquely pin down the solution to the equation, I assume that the wage bill goes
to zero as employment goes to zero: lim
ni→0
hniwi = 0. This results in
wi =

h
σ
σ − MRPLi.
From (1.20) follows:
wi =

h
[
σ
σ − MRPLi +
ϕ
q(θ)(1− ω)
]
− 1− (1− τ)h
[
− b+ κ[ln(1− h) + h] + β(1− χ− p(θ))V W ′
]
(1.24)
∂wi
∂ni
ni = − 
h
1
σ − MRPLi.
Plugging into (1.6) yields the labor demand curve, (1.9). Rearranging (1.24) and
substituting for β(1− χ− p(θ))V W ′ in (1.8) yields:
V W = 1− (1− τ)
[
σ
σ − MRPLi − wih+
ϕ
q(θ)(1− ω)
]
.
Using (1.9) and shifting one period forward gives:
V W
′ = 1− (1− τ)
ϕ
q(θ)(1− ω)
1
β(1− δ) .
Plugging into (1.8) yields (1.11). Finally, substituting the solution for V W ′ into (1.24)
gives (1.10).
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Exploring the Causes of Frictional Wage
Dispersion
2.1 Introduction
Residual wage dispersion is large in the US, the typical Mincer wage regression
explains only around a third of observed wage variation, and growing over a cohort
of workers’ life-cycle. To understand this inequality, knowledge of the wage offer
distribution and the distribution of idiosyncratic wage uncertainty are of first order
importance. Yet, their empirical inference has proven to be non-trivial. They are
inherently unobservable, and observed wage dynamics are the result of people self-
selecting into and out of employment and accepting and refusing wage offers while
on the job. Reduced form estimations rely on instrumental variable approaches,
but credible instruments have proven hard to come by. The alternative is to make
structural assumptions to infer these objects from within a model environment.
Search theory is a natural starting point for this analysis. The search friction
introduces a trade-off between accepting a job offer now or waiting in unemployment
to sample a better one. This induces what we refer to as frictional wage dispersion:
workers of identical observable characteristics earn different wages in equilibrium.
The challenge for structural approaches is to correctly identify the channels that
determine the range of acceptable job offers to the worker. Yet, as Hornstein et al.
(2011) (henceforth HKV) point out, a large part of the search and matching models
commonly used in empirical applications cannot, by construction, account for the
amount of residual inequality found in U.S. data given realistic parameterizations.
One could conclude from this finding that most residual inequality is the result of
measurement error in wages or the explanatory variables and that measurement error
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is a highly persistent process. Indeed, estimated versions of many of the models
presented in HKV either have to attribute much of wage inequality to measurement
error or produce unreasonably low estimates of discount factors and/or the replacement
rate. We take the view; however, that this conclusion should be drawn from a model
that theoretically could account for the observed residual inequality. Otherwise,
structural estimation might just be missing important dimensions to the worker
problem.
Our main contribution is twofold. First, we build a structural model that is
consistent with the large amount of residual wage dispersion present in our data set
and its increase over a cohort’s life-cycle. Our model includes a number of important
channels that enlarge the set of acceptable job offers: Worker productivity is stochastic
and unemployed workers face skill depreciation and finite unemployment benefits.
Employed workers experience learning by doing on the job and can continue to search
for better job prospects while working. We demonstrate that the skill development
process and the ability to search on the job are key ingredients in generating realistic
amounts of frictional wage dispersion. We also highlight that calibrated on the
job search efficiencies need to account for the fact that one third of all observed
job switches result in nominal wage losses. This statistic allows us to discriminate
between our model and a pure job-ladder model in explaining the data. Second, we
demonstrate that we can use our model to quantify the contribution of firm effects,
changes in individual productivity and measurement error to wage dispersion across
agents and over the life-cycle, using second moments from wage data. Across different
age groups, our baseline specification finds a mean contribution of 17.5 percent of
frictional wage dispersion to overall inequality.
Regarding the last result, we also shed light on why the literature so far has
produced such divergent estimates. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) conclude that
search frictions are responsible for only 6 percent of overall wage inequality. In
comparison, the seminal paper by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) finds numbers as
high as 100 percent. Our results suggest that the way the latter paper models job
to job transitions is in part responsible for that finding. Like most other on the
job search models, it attributes all job to job transitions to movements into more
productive matches. Given the substantial size of job to job flows in the data, this
implies search efficiencies have to be high. In the light of the frequent occurrence of
32
2.2 Empirical Motivation
wage losses upon movement; however, this assumption seems to exaggerate search
efficiency and causes these models to overstate the importance of search frictions in
generating wage dispersion. Indeed, when solving a pure on the job search calibration
of our model, capable of explaining large frictional wage dispersion but neglecting
wage losses, the contribution of the search friction to overall wage inequality more
than doubles to over 40 percent.
Related to this chapter are a few recent contributions that augment the standard
search model to replicate the empirically observed amount of residual wage dispersion.
Burdett et al. (2011) and Carrillo-Tudela (2010) introduce a restricted form of
experience into an on the job search model. Papp (2012) shows that wage posting
combined with the assumption of Bertrand competition in the labor market can
lead to almost arbitrarily large frictional wage dispersion. Also related is a line of
literature that empirically asses the importance of different sources of wage inequality.
Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) set up on the job search models and structurally estimate
them on French panel data. This line of literature also includes the aforementioned
contribution by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010)
choose a reduced-form approach in quantifying the contributions of search frictions
to wage inequality. Finally, Low et al. (2010) use an instrumental variable approach
to estimate the firm offer distribution and idiosyncratic wage risk.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The following section provides
some empirical motivation and takes a closer look at the efficiency of on the job
search. Afterwards, we present our model and discuss parameterization. We present
and analyzes our results and discuss their relation to the existing literature. The last
section concludes. Additional information on the empirical part and the numerical
algorithm is relegated to an appendix. All programs used for data analysis and model
solution are available on the author’s web pages.
2.2 Empirical Motivation
In this section, we introduce our data set, the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), and discuss sample selection. To motivate our further analysis,
we then present two sets of facts from the data. First, we estimate residual wage
dispersion and show its magnitude to be substantial. Second, we discuss wage changes
33
Chapter 2
after employment to employment transitions. We argue that previous studies of
on the job search have inadequately addressed the large fraction of employment to
employment transitions which result in wage losses.
2.2.1 Data Source and Sample Creation
Our model, to be presented in the next section, places great emphasis on job to
job transitions and accompanying wage changes as well as wage dynamics on the
job. Our empirical analysis needs to accurately identify these phenomena. Therefore,
we require longitudinal monthly wage information which identifies employer and
occupation changes. The data set most adequate for these requirements is the 1993
sample of SIPP. It is a representative sample of the non-institutionalized civilian US
population maintained by the US Census Bureau. The level of detail it provides
in individual records allows us to accurately identify an individual’s main job and
hourly wages on that job. In addition, the 1993 cohort combines survey data with
administrative records to accurately identify employer changes1 2.
In constructing the panel, the Census Bureau randomly assigns people to rotation
groups, which are then interviewed subsequently on a four-month basis. During the
interviews, the respondents give information on their labor market status for each
week in the past four months separately, which is then used to assign one of eight
possible activity statuses. While this form of reporting allows for a very precise
labor market classification, it also constitutes one of the sample’s few drawbacks. It
makes it hard to compare unemployment measures based on this classification to
unemployment in the Current Population Survey (CPS). It has also been shown to
downward bias estimates of transition flows between employment and unemployment3.
When calibrating these flow rates below, we therefore use estimates from corresponding
CPS cohorts. Both panels are representative samples from the same population so
this should be unproblematic.
The survey covers the years 1993-1995 (which also includes some observations from
1992)4 and therefore provides us with up to 36 months of observations per individual.
1See Stinson (2003)
2The survey reports at most two jobs for each four-month recording period. In case an individual
has more than two jobs, the two jobs with the most hours worked are reported.
3See Mazumder (2007) for a discussion.
4Our data set grounds on CEPR SIPP extracts available for download at
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We use observations from individuals aged 23-65, for whom we require complete
information on the individual’s employment status, age and employer id. On top of
that, we only consider an individual’s primary job5. We drop workers reporting to be
school enrolled, the self-employed, family-workers, members of the armed forces and
workers at non-profit companies. Finally, we truncate the wage distribution at the
top and bottom 1% to take care of outliers and top-coding6. These restrictions leave
us with 754,345 person/month observations7.
The SIPP asks respondents whether they are paid by the hour and their corre-
sponding hourly pay rate in each month. We use this hourly pay rate whenever a
worker is paid by the hour. The SIPP also reports total monthly earnings at each job,
whether the job lasted the entire month and the amount of hours worked per week.
We assume that workers do not alter their earning responses based on the length
of a month and use smooth 4.3 weeks months when computing monthly earnings of
those workers that are not paid by the hour8. SIPP records starting date and ending
date of each job that is not lasting the entire month, and we use this information to
calculate hourly wages for these jobs.
We identify job to job transitions as those employment changes where the worker
works in two consecutive months, the technology with which the worker operates
changes and the worker does not report a spell of unemployment in between9. We
http://www.ceprdata.org/sipp/sipp_data.php.
We modify these abstracts to include further information contained in the original SIPP files but
not in the abstracts.
5As primary job we consider the position where the largest share of hours worked is spent.
6Earnings are topcoded at $33333 for a four months period.
7The programs used to prepare the data for analysis are also available from the authors’ web pages.
They contain further details on how we deal with missing attributes and other choices inherent
in data preparation.
8One issue about using the hourly pay rate is worth mentioning. In general, we are interested in
total worker compensation. When workers are asked about their hourly pay rate, the interviewer
asks: "What was your regular hourly pay rate at the end of month X". Therefore, respondents
are unlikely to include any bonuses or performance payments. Contrary, when asking about
total monthly earnings interviewers state: "Be sure to include any tips, bonuses, overtime pay,
or commissions". We still decide to use the hourly pay rate, whenever available because it is
likely to reduce measurement error.
9Theoretically, we could use the weekly employment status and count job to job transitions only
when a worker is employed in two consecutive weeks. However, we want to allow workers to
spend some days between jobs, which they may need to commute, or do other pre-work required
activities. Consequently, we only discard observations where the worker reports to actively seek
a job during non-employment.
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assume that an operating technology is job specific and record a job transition
whenever the employer identification number changes, or the two digit occupational
identifier changes. Appendix 2.B provides a discussion for alternative measures of
job to job transitions and compares our estimate to those obtained from CPS data.
2.2.2 Frictional Wage Dispersion in the SIPP
For subsequent comparison with the amount of frictional dispersion in our model,
we start by estimating the amount of residual wage dispersion in our data. To
control for observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity as well as time effects,
we employ the estimation method outlined in Hornstein et al. (2007). For each
period in the sample, unique combination of year/month, we run an OLS regression
of individual hourly log wages on 9 regional dummies, 14 occupational dummies10,
4 education dummies (less than high school, high school, some college, college), a
dummy for marital status, one for non-white, one for disabled workers, age, age
squared and the number of children. This yields a set of residuals {it}. The mean
R2 of these regressions is 0.36. We then compute unobserved individual effects as
¯i =
∑Ti
t=1 it/Ti. The residual wage corresponding to individual i in period t is then
w˜it = exp(it − ¯i). Note that this measure is quite conservative. The distribution of
residual wages has large mass around one because many workers never experience job
to job transitions over the relatively short observation period and thus the individual
fixed effect captures the full firm effect in wages11.
Table 2.1 summarizes a number of moments of the resulting distribution of residual
wage inequality: the ratio of the mean wage to the minimum wage (Mm-ratio),
the Gini coefficient and the variance of log wages. The Mm-ratio is the summary
statistic advocated by HKV and for comparability to their result and other studies,
it is our leading measure. Since the lowest wages in the data are likely the result
of measurement error, we report a number of low percentiles as candidates for the
minimum wage. The size or residual inequality is substantial and comparable to the
10Occupation is likely to be correlated with individual ability as well firm effects. We want to
control for the former but leave the latter untouched. Our compromise is to only include very
broad occupational categories, as they should be less firm specific. Dropping occupations from
our estimations altogether lowers the R2 by 0.1 without materially affecting the Mean-Min ratio,
our main summary statistic for residual inequality.
11We thank Tamás Papp and an anonymous referee for making us aware of this issue.
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Table 2.1: Residual Wage Inequality in the 1993 SIPP
Mean-Min Ratio Gini V ar(log(w˜it))
1st 2.18
Pctl. 5th 1.48 0.091 0.031
10th 1.31
Notes: The table reports summary measures of residual wage inequality
in the 1993 SIPP: the mean to minimum ratio, the Gini coefficient and
the variance of log wages after controlling for region, broad occupation,
education, marital status, non-whites, disabilities, a quadratic in age, the
number of children and individual fixed effects. Since the lowest wage
observations in the data are likely the result of measurement error, we re-
port several low percentiles as candidates for the actual minimum wage
in the data.
one found by other studies (see Hornstein et al. (2007))12.
2.2.3 Wages and On the Job Search
Wage Losses from Employment to Employment Transitions
One of the most important potential channels for enlarging the set of acceptable
job offers to the worker is the ability to continue searching on the job. In this
case, the trade-off is between earning more than unemployment benefits now and
reduced search efficiency on the job. If search on the job is fairly efficient, this will
substantially enlarge the range of acceptable offers13.
Studies of on the job search typically calibrate on the job search efficiency to
observed employment to employment flow rates. Meanwhile, Fallick and Fleischman
(2004) find in the CPS that a worker who reports to be actively searching on the
job is more likely to be unemployed next month. Likewise, Fujita (2011) uses a
question in the UK labor force survey that asks for the reason of on the job search.
He finds that of those reporting searching, 12% do so because they fear to lose
12We also perform a more standard Mincer wage regression that ignores individual fixed effects.
The resulting Mm-ratio at the first and fifth percentile are 2.78 and 2.03, respectively. Hornstein
et al. (2007) obtain very similar results for PSID data. Without controlling for individual effects,
the Mm-ratio at the first and fifth percentile are 2.73 and 2.08, respectively. Once they control
for individual effects, those numbers drop to 1.9 and 1.46.
13Of course, if search efficiency on the job is as high as in unemployment, the worker will accepts
any wage offer at least as high as UI benefits.
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their current job and 27% because they are unsatisfied with the current job because
of non-monetary reasons. This evidence seems clearly at odds with predictions of
job-ladder models. Nágipal (2005) shows within a basic job-ladder model that search
on the job would have to be more efficient than during unemployment in order to
replicate some characteristics of flow rates. In our view, these pieces of evidence imply
other mechanisms behind the magnitude of employment to employment movements
than job-ladders only. They also hint at on the job search being less efficient than
previously assumed, and an accurate calibration of search efficiencies should take
these concerns into account.
The SIPP asks workers that terminate a job for the reason of doing so. While this
appears to be the information that perfectly suits our analysis, we want to emphasis
several problems with the variable. First and foremost, less than 30% of all workers
making a job to job transition provide information on this variable14 15. Second, the
question targets solely individuals that change employer id, but not those that switch
occupations within the same firm. Third, the answers are not mutually exclusive and
the interviewer provides no additional guidelines to choose among these mutually
non-exclusive answers16. Nevertheless, we find the information instructive to get a
sense of the magnitude of job to job transitions that do not necessarily result from
the desire to move up the job-ladder. Only 55% of those responding to the question
and making a job to job transition state that they quit to take another job. 19% of
jobs ended because the previous job did not provide the possibility to continue17.
Another 20% answer either that they had "unsatisfactory work arrangements", or
"quit for some other reason". The remaining worker made a transition because of
personal or family related reasons. Taken together, the result supports the view that
a large share of identified job to job transitions does not result in a move to a better
paying job.
In Table 2.2 we supply additional evidence to support that claim using a moment
that does not suffer from the drawbacks mentioned above. A pervasive phenomenon
14The question is not applicable for a negligible share of transitions because only the main job
changed, but the worker stays with his old employer.
15See Nágipal (2008) who also uses this information.
16For example, a possible answer is that the individual "quit to take another job" and an alternative
answer is that the individual had an "unsatisfactory work arrangements".
17This includes "on layoff", "job was temporary and ended", "discharged/fired", "employer bankrupt",
"employer sold business" and "slack work or business conditions"
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Table 2.2: Wage Cuts after Job to Job Transitions
Sample Stratification Share loss Mean loss
Whole sample 0.339 -0.22
Job characteristics
Union 0.35 -0.249
+ Health insurance 0.355 -0.249
+ Education 0.355 -0.249
Year 1993 0.3301 -0.2068
1994 0.3299 -0.23
1995 0.3638 -0.2256
Sex Male 0.3367 -0.2261
Female 0.3421 -0.2122
Age 23-30 0.3483 -0.2274
31-50 0.3368 -0.2198
51-65 0.3230 -0.1981
Notes: The table shows the share of workers incurring a nominal cut in hourly wages after a job to job move-
ment for the whole population and different subsamples in the 1993 SIPP. Mean loss reports the mean wage loss
in log points conditional on suffering a wage cut upon movement.
in the data is that job to job transitions result in nominal wage losses. In the whole
population roughly one third of all transitions result in workers earning lower hourly
wages in the month after transition compared to the last month at the previous
job. The months surrounding a job to job transition might be particularly prone to
reporting error. Therefore, we also constructed three-month-averages of wages after
and before a movement. This robustness check does not affect any of our estimates.
In terms of real wage changes, the share of wage losses increases to roughly one half18.
The top panel of Table 2.2 shows that the result is robust across different stratifi-
cations of the data concerning non-monetary job characteristics. First, we exclude
observations where a worker moves from a non-unionized to a unionized job. The
18In principle, the worker should only care about real wages. But in the presence of some wage
rigidity, the worker expects a wage loss on his current job as well and compares nominal wages.
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resulting share of workers incurring a wage loss goes up by about one percentage
point. Subsequently deleting transitions where a worker moves from a job that did not
provide health insurance to one that does provide it, increases this share by another
half percentage point. Finally, deleting observations where the former employer did
not pay for educational training, but the current employer does, has no effect on
the share. A likely explanation for the robustness of the result is that even though
workers value these non-monetary benefits of a job, jobs that have high non-monetary
benefits are usually associated with higher wage income (see for example Dey and
Flinn (2008)).
The result is also robust across different stratifications of the data concerning
worker characteristics. Table 2.2 splits the sample by year, sex and age, and we
always find a share around 33% of workers incurring wage losses at a job to job
movement. Appendix 2.B shows that the result stay robust to stratifying the data by
tenure at the former job, earnings at the former job and industries and looking at
real instead of nominal wage changes.
In the interpretation of this chapter, an important part of these transitions are
either the result of jobs accepted within notice period of dismissal or movements for
non-economic reasons (moving in with one’s spouse, moving close to ones parents,
etc.). To proxy for these causes, our model includes what Jolivet et al. (2006) label
forced job movements: randomly drawn on the job offers, which the worker can accept
or move into unemployment.
If idiosyncratic worker productivity uncertainty is large relative to firm dispersion,
parts of these wage cuts will be the result of negative shocks to general human capital,
and some of them will be simply measurement error. Consequently, our baseline
model includes innovations to worker productivity and all our simulations explicitly
include measurement error to account for these causes. In Appendix 2.B we give
consideration to an alternative explanation brought forward by Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002) and extended by Cahuc et al. (2006). They lay out a framework, in
which workers will accept wage cuts upon job to job transitions, if the option value
of working at the other firm is sufficiently high. Indeed, Papp (2012) shows that
this framework can rationalize a large amount of wage cuts and large frictional wage
dispersion. The key operating mechanism in this class of models is that workers who
experienced wage losses have on average steeper observed wage growth afterwards,
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i.e. wages are backloaded. As we show, there is no indication of that mechanism
occurring in our data. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) provide further evidence
against the mechanism. They show that wage growth of job stayers is uncorrelated
to local labor market tightness in the US, whereas the model by Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002) predicts it to be an increasing function of the probability to receive a
job offer19.
2.3 The Model
This section explains the worker’s decision problem when employed and unemployed.
We introduce a bargaining game between workers and potential employers that maps
productivities into wage outcomes. We show that the resulting log wage schedule
can be almost perfectly approximated by a linear function in log worker and log
firm productivity. We want to stress that the additional notation coming from the
general equilibrium set-up, serves only the microfoundation of the log linear wage
schedule. Our quantitative results would have stayed the same, if we had taken a
partial equilibrium view and had postulated a log linear wage schedule.
2.3.1 The Labor Market
A firm is a match producing with the worker’s idiosyncratic log productivity At
and firm specific log productivity Γt20. Firms’ log productivity is drawn from the
distribution F ∼ N(0, σ2F ). Once a worker and a firm decide to form a match, they
produce output yt according to:
yt = exp(At + Γt).
We assume that search is random and the labor market is governed by a matching
function mt = ξuιtv1−ιt where vt are vacancies and ut is unemployment. The matching
function implies an unemployed worker contact rate q(θt) and a job offer probability
19The same holds true for models that stress the importance of learning about match quality over
time.
20Γ is the only source of match effects in our model, which we interpret as firm productivity.
However, one can broaden this interpretation to include match specific effects and, as Winfried
Koeniger pointed out to us, differences arising from bargaining over quasi rents from capital.
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p(θt) that depend only on labor market tightness θt = vtut . Additional dimensions of
worker heterogeneity are their life-cycle state φ and unemployment benefit eligibility,
indicated by $.
2.3.2 The Households’ Problem
Household period income is given by:
It(At,Γt, φt) =

wt(At,Γt, φt) if employed
min{bmax, bt(At, φt)}+ Z(At, φt) if $ = u1
Zt(At, φt) if $ = u2
When the agent is in state u1, he receives unemployment insurance benefits (UI), but
with probability λl he loses the benefit entitlement and moves to state u2. After match
destruction, an agent is always entitled to benefits21. bmax are statutory maximum
UI payments. Both unemployment benefits and the value of leisure depend on the
worker’s idiosyncratic states:
b(At, φt) = rrb · E
[
wt(At,Γt, φt)|At, φt
]
Z(At, φt) = rrZ · E
[
wt(At,Γt, φt)|At, φt
]
.
Expectations are taken over the range of acceptable job offers, which themselves
depend on At and φt. In the case of unemployment insurance, this captures the
fact that benefits depend on prior contributions. More productive workers earn
higher wages, and older workers likely contributed for a longer time. In the case
of the value of leisure, we choose this as the closest analogy to the homogeneous
agent world22. One can interpret this formulation as a reduced form for modeling
wealth heterogeneity. More productive workers tend to have higher asset levels and
unemployed workers deplete their assets over time.
In modeling productivity development, we are guided by the finding of Dustmann
21Low et al. (2010) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) assume that entitlement is conditional on
the separation being involuntary on part of the worker. We choose a different path in assuming
that the cause of separation is unobservable to the UI agency.
22Giving everyone the same value of leisure would increase the amount of implied frictional wage
dispersion.
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and Meghir (2005), who show that the first two years of labor market experience raise
wages substantially, 6-10% per year, whereas the return to experience is substantially
lower afterwards, 0-1.2%23. We therefore introduce the life-cycle dimension φ where
agents transit through two life-cycle states with stochastic transition probabilities
p = (p1, p2). When the second shock hits, the agent dies and is replaced by an
unemployed labor market entrant in state u2, whose idiosyncratic log productivity is
drawn from the distribution N ∼ N(µN , σ2N).
The evolution of worker productivity depends on the agent’s employment status,
and in case the agent is employed it also depends on his life-cycle state:
At+1 =
max(At + ν(φ) + t, pmin) if employedmax(At − δ + t, pmin) if unemployed
δ represents skill depreciation while being unemployed, pmin is a subsistence level
of productivity and ν(φ) is a drift term that depends on the life-cycle state.  is a
productivity shock with  ∼ N(0, σ2 ). We think of wage shocks as anything altering
productivity, such as demand shocks for specific skills or health shocks. The fact that
net productivity growth can be negative entails that our model also features wage
cuts on the job.
We assume that firms cannot commit to a wage path, and wages are renegotiated
by generalized Nash-Bargaining each period. Employed workers continue to search for
better job prospects, and once an outside offer arrives all parties have full information
about their respective productivities. We assume that a worker cannot go back to his
former employer after initiating wage bargaining with a new employer24. Consequently,
his outside option is unemployment with benefit entitlement when bargaining with
the new firm. Following our discussion in Section 2.2.3, we model some job to job
transitions as forced movements. An employed worker receives a job offer with
probability λ and can, in general, decide to stay with his old match or form a new
23Dustmann and Meghir (2005) use German data but have the advantage of identifying effects by
using displaced workers. For U.S. data, Altonji and Williams (1998) come to similar results.
24In the context of on the job search, the bargaining set may be non-convex and the Nash-Bargaining
solution therefore be undefined as discussed in Shimer (2006). As shown by Moscarini (2005) pp.
496, our set-up can be reconciled with Nash-Bargaining by assuming an English auction between
incumbent and poaching firm in which firms do not play weekly dominant strategies. The
resulting wage changes in this chapter are equivalent to that assumption, e.g., the equilibrium
outcome is to bid zero in the English auction.
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match. However, when receiving an outside offer, with probability λd the offer is a
forced movement and the outside option becomes unemployment.
We can thus define the value of employment, V Eφ , and the value of unemployment,
V Uφ,$, for each life-cycle state. The value of employment depends on worker and
firm productivity, and the value of unemployment depends on worker productivity
and benefit entitlement. We state the Bellman equations describing the problems of
agents in the first life-cycle state as an example. The value of employment reads:
V E1 (At,Γt) = wt(At,Γt, 1) + βEt
{
(1− ω)[
(1− p1)[(1− λ)H(1) + λ[(1− λd)ΩE(1) + λdΛ(1)]]
+ p1[(1− λ)H(2) + λ[(1− λd)ΩE(2) + λdΛ(2)]]
]
+ ω
[
(1− p1)V U1,u1(At+1) + p1V U2,u1(At+1)
]}
.
Et is the expectation operator given all information in period t and ω is an exogenous
match destruction shock. For clarity of presentation, we define the upper envelopes
for receiving a regular job offer on the job, ΩE(x), receiving a forced job offer,
Λ(x), and the decision to quit into unemployment voluntarily, H(x), as result of a
negative productivity shock. Γ′t+1 is firm productivity at an outside job offer. All are
conditional on the life-cycle state:
ΩE(x) = max
∫
{V Ex (At+1,Γt+1), V Ux,u1(At+1), V Ex (At+1,Γ′t+1)}dF
H(x) = max{V Ex (At+1,Γt+1), V Ux,u1(At+1)}
Λ(x) = max
∫
{V Ex (At+1,Γ′t+1), V Ux,u1(At+1)}dF.
There are two value functions for the unemployed, with and without benefit
entitlement. Once benefits expire, the agent’s flow value is reduced to the utility of
leisure:
V U1,u2(At) = Z + βEt
{
(1− p1)[p(θ)ΩU(1, u2) + (1− p(θ))V U1,u2(At+1)]
+ p1[p(θ)ΩU(2, u2) + (1− p(θ))V U2,u2(At+1)]
}
.
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Conditional on receiving benefits, the value of unemployment solves:
V U1,u1(At) = b+ Z + βEt
{
(1− λl)[
(1− p1)[p(θ)ΩU(1, u1) + (1− p(θ))V U1,u1(At+1)]
+ p1[p(θ)ΩU(2, u1) + (1− p(θ))V U2,u1(At+1)]
]
+ λl
[
(1− p1)[p(θ)ΩU(1, u2) + (1− p(θ))V U1,u2(At+1)]
+ p1[p(θ)ΩU(2, u2) + (1− p(θ))V U2,u2(At+1)]
]}
,
where we define the conditional upper envelope for receiving a job offer:
ΩU(x,$) = max
∫
{V Ex (At+1,Γt+1), V Ux,$(At+1)}dF.
2.3.3 The Firms’ Problem
An entering firm’s problem is described by its value to post a vacancy, V I . An open
vacancy entails flow costs of ϕ each period. We assume vacancies are homogeneous ex
ante and the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity reveals only upon meeting
a worker. When a worker is contacted, Γ is drawn from F 25. There are three ways
to fill a vacancy. First, an unemployed agent might be contacted, occurring with
probability q(θ). Second, the firm might poach a worker that is employed and make
him a job offer, which happens at rate λ(1−λd)
v
. Or third, a worker might be offered
the vacancy by a forced job movement occurring at rate λλd
v
. Note that in any case,
the ex-ante acceptance probability depends on the productivity of the vacancy. Given
that firm and worker productivities are complements, more productive vacancies
attract also less productive workers and are less likely to lose parts of their workforce
to other firms. We relegate the further description of V I to Appendix 2.A.1, as it
does not provide much further insights.
The value of a filled vacancy, V Jx , depends on the life-cycle state of the matched
25This can be rationalized by assuming that there is a match specific component in productivity.
The assumption assures that wages are a monotone function in firm productivity. See Eeckhout
and Kircher (2011) for a simple model where match productivity is fully firm specific and wages
are not an increasing function in firm productivity for all worker types.
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employee and a firm employing someone in life-cycle state one has value:
V J1 (At,Γt) = yt − w(At,Γt, 1) + β(1− ω)Et
{
(1− λ)[(1− p1)Φ(1) + p1Φ(2)]
+ λ(1− λd)η(Γt+1)[(1− p1)Φ(1) + p1Φ(2)]
}
.
where η(Γ) is the probability that the worker stays with the firm when contacted from
an outside firm, which is increasing in Γ. Moreover, we define the upper envelope of
match continuation conditional on the life-cycle state and productivities
Φ(x) = max{0, V Jx (At+1,Γt+1)}.
The equilibrium definition is standard and can be found in Appendix 2.A where we
also provide a summary of within-period timing.
2.3.4 Approximating the Wage Schedule
To facilitate our subsequent analysis and to make our approach more comparable
to standard microeconometric specifications, we approximate the equilibrium log
wage schedule by a linear function. From the Nash-Bargaining solution it is obvious
Figure I: Wages for different At
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Figure II: Wages for different Γt
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Notes: The figures display the equilibrium log wage schedule for workers in the second life-cycle state.
Figure I fixes firm productivity at its median level. 95 percent of all workers employed at such matches have
productivity levels below the dashed line. Figure II fixes worker productivity at its median value and varies
firm productivity.
46
2.4 Parameterization
that log wages are not a linear function in worker and firm productivity. Figures I
and II plot ln(w) over worker and firm productivity for agents in life-cycle state 2,
holding the productivity of the other fixed at its mean value. The plots indicate that
these functions can still be reasonably well approximated by a linear function. We
asses this more formally by fitting a linear OLS regression to an economy generated
by the true non-linear dynamics of our model. To be more specific, we simulate 50000
workers for 3 years from the stationary distribution using our non-linear model. We
then project the resulting data into a linear space employing the regression
ln(wi,t) = β0 + β1Ai,t + β2φi,t + β3Γi,t + ai,t. (2.1)
Note, assuming the law of large number holds, the error term ai,t measures the
approximation error that results from the linear projection. We obtain an R2 above
0.9996, suggesting that the fit of the linear regression model is quite good. We continue
to work from now on with the linear approximation (2.1) to our true non-linear model.
2.4 Parameterization
We pursue a dual strategy in parameterizing our model. We take a number of
parameter values from other studies, which makes our results easily comparable.
Also, for many of those parameters (e.g., bargaining share) our results are robust to
variations. We come back to this point below. The particular focus of this chapter
requires us to take great care in calibrating worker and firm productivity dispersion
and flow rates in and out of employment and between firms. Wherever possible, we
therefore estimate our calibration targets for the related parameters using our own
data set in order to insure consistency. Although the SIPP provides very detailed
and extensive coverage, we cannot estimate all of the productivity parameters on
the basis of our data set. Therefore, we take additional information from other
micro studies carefully discussing each of our choices. This section proceeds as
follows: We first discuss our calibration regarding non-distributional parameters
(preferences, institutions, flow rates) in Section 2.4.1. In Section 2.4.2, we discuss
our calibration strategy regarding firm and idiosyncratic productivity dispersion.
Table 2.3 summarizes our calibration.
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2.4.1 Non-Distributional Parameters
The model period is one month. When comparing monthly wages in the model to
hourly wages in the data, we assume an average of 160 work hours per month. The
length of a period is of importance because it puts an upper bound on the job offer
probability, p(θ), and the minimum duration of an unemployment spell. A maximum
of one offer per month is well supported by the data26, but the second constraint is
likely to be binding27.
We calculate the employment to unemployment and unemployment to employment
flow rates of the US non-institutionalized population from CPS data for the years
1994-1995 following Fallick and Fleischman (2004) for reasons discussed in Section 2.2.
The exogenous job destruction rate, ω, is set such that the total job destruction rate,
the sum of endogenous and exogenous movements from employment to unemployment,
is 1.43 percent per month. We attach to ξ a value that implies a monthly job finding
rate of 0.271.
We use SIPP data to calibrate the parameters guiding on the job search. Information
on job to job movements and wage changes identify λ and λd. We adjust λ to imply
that 2.45 percent of workers switch employers every period. As discussed previously,
in order to correctly model the efficiency of on the job search, it is important to
know how many of these movements result in wage improvements. Our identifying
assumption for separating voluntary and involuntary movements is that voluntary
movements always result in expected wage increases. In our data set, 34 percent of
all job to job movements result in a nominal wage loss. Conditional on processes for
measurement error and idiosyncratic productivity innovations, which are described
below, we can use the rate of forced movements, λd to match this statistic, which
implies λd = 0.152.
There is a large debate on the appropriate values for α, ι and θ because of their
importance for business-cycle fluctuations. Fortunately, in our steady state analysis,
these parameters do not affect our results because they only affect the job finding
26Holzer (1988) reports based on NLSY data that 34 percent of the unemployed received at least
one job offer and 12 percent received more than one offer per month.
27See Clark and Summers (1979). Our model cannot by construction match the high observed
outflow rates within the first month. However, time disaggregation below one month is rather
costly because our numerical algorithm uses value function iteration, which converges at a rate
of 1− β.
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rate. Changing the parameters only leads to a recalibration of ξ. Henceforth, we
normalize α = ι = 0.5 and use ϕ to match a labor market tightness of 0.6.
Consistent with findings from Siegel (2002) for average bond and stock returns, we
set β to imply a yearly interest rate of 4 percent. Next, we consider the flow value of
unemployment. We set the replacement rate rrb to 25 percent. As argued in Hall
and Milgrom (2008), this provides a parsimonious description of the system. The
maximum UI benefit payment is set to 1168 $, which is the average across US states.
The parameter determining the value of leisure, rrz, is set to 15 percent which yields
a total replacement rate of 40 percent when entering into unemployment as in Shimer
(2005). Last, we fix the probability for an unemployed worker to lose his benefit
entitlement such that average entitlement is six months, which is the standard length
in the US system outside of economic crisis.
In the presence of tenure and selection effects, it would be very hard, and potentially
produce unreliable results, to estimate mean experience gains from our data set.
We therefore use life-cycle transition rates and drift terms in productivity during
employment to match statistics found by Dustmann and Meghir (2005). Productivity
is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 8 percent when employed during the first
life-cycle state and at a rate of 1 percent during the second. The transition probability
between life-cycle states, (p), is set such that agents spend on average 24 months in
the first state and 480 in the second. In line with Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008),
who assume that skill depreciation is twice the rate of skill accumulation, e.g., 2%.
The subsistence level of log productivity, pmin, is set to -2, which is never binding.
2.4.2 Distributional Parameters
We now describe the way we calibrate the variance of log firm productivity, σ2F ,
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, σ2 , and initial worker productivities, σ2N . None
of the statistics is directly observable in the data because of measurement error.
Additionally, agents endogenously select themselves into and out of employment and
into employment with firms of specific productivity levels in response to idiosyncratic
productivity developments. Instead, we identify the moments from within our model.
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Table 2.3: Calibration
Variable Target
β = 0.9967 4 percent annual interest rate
ϕ = 1427 θ = 0.6
α = ι = 0.5 Normalization
rrb = 0.25 bmeanwmean = 0.25
rrZ = 0.15 Zmeanwmean = 0.15
bmax 1168$
λl = 0.16 6 month benefit duration
ω = 0.01 EU flow rate of 0.0143
ξ = 0.48 UE flow rate of 0.271
λ = 0.0845 JTJ flow rate of 0.0245
λd = 0.152 34 percent of JTJ movements lead to wage cuts
ν(1) = 0.0067 8 percent productivity growth
ν(2) = 0.00083 1 percent productivity growth
p1 = 0.04 2 years in 1st life-cycle
p2 = 0.002 40 years in 2nd life-cycle
δ = 0.00167 2 percent skill depreciation
pmin = −2 Normalization
σF = 0.342 Equation (2.3)=0.055
σ = 0.018 Life-cycle wage profile
σN = 0.28 Life-cycle wage profile
σι = 0.0236 Estimation
µN = 6.88 Mean monthly wage 2070$
Notes: The left column states the calibrated variable with its value and the second states the
relevant moment. EU stands for employment to unemployment, UE for unemployment to employ-
ment, and JTJ for job to job.
Measuring Firm Heterogeneity
For identification of the firm productivity distribution, we require only a small set
of assumptions. Other than specifying a general additive specification for log wages
and assuming firm productivities to be log normally distributed, our identification
only relies on the assumption that measurement error for job switchers is not more
severe than for job stayers28.
28As discussed in the appendix, we are excluding from our sample those individuals who are holding
multiple jobs after a transition to rule out this source of additional reporting error.
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In our SIPP data, we assume that wages are generated by
ln(wi,t) = α0 + α1dt + α2Zi + β2Γi + ei,t, (2.2)
where dt captures aggregate states, such as TFP, and Zi is a vector of idiosyncratic
components. We split the unobservable, ei,t, into two parts:
ei,t = ri,t + β1Ai,t.
As in the model, Ai,t is assumed to follow a random walk with drift and innovations
i,t, and ri,t captures measurement error. For our present purpose, we have to make
no further assumptions regarding the distributional properties of measurement error.
First-differencing eliminates the idiosyncratic wage components29. As mentioned
above, we only observe a self-selected subset of the realizations of Γ and  as agents
can quit into unemployment after negative productivity shocks and refuse wage offers.
The subsets of observed realizations, Γobs and obs, are themselves random variables,
which follow distributions of unknown functional forms.
We can now define observed wage growth when a job to job transition takes place:
∆ln(wbi,t) = ν + κt + β2[Γobsi − Γobsi−1] + β1obsi,t + ∆ri,t,
and when no such transition takes place:
∆ln(wwi,t) = ν + κt + β1obsi,t + ∆ri,t,
where κt = α1(dt− dt−1). After regressing out constant and time dummies, we obtain
the residual excess variance of job movers relative to job stayers30:
V ar
[
∆ln(wˆbi,t)
]
− V ar
[
∆ln(wˆwi,t)
]
= β22V ar
[
Γobsi − Γobsi,−1
]
+ 2β1β2Cov
[
obsi,t (Γobsi − Γobsi,−1)
]
, (2.3)
29In our estimations, we also checked for idiosyncratic differences in wage growth by including
gender, race, industry and regional dummies. These variables were neither individually nor
jointly significant.
30We delete the top and bottom 0.75% of the wage growth observations to get rid of reporting error.
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where we invoke the assumption that measurement error is uncorrelated with the
event of job switching.
In Section 2.3.4, we demonstrate that the wage schedule in our model can be
accurately approximated by a log-linear approximation analogous to equation (2.2)
given by equation (2.1). Equation (2.3) therefore also approximately holds in our
model and we can use it as a calibration target for σ2F . All endogenous sorting that
causes the observed productivity distribution in the data to differ from the true one
is also present in our model.
Calibrating Idiosyncratic Productivity Uncertainty and Measurement Error
In principle, we could derive a moment condition similar to the one above in order
to identify idiosyncratic productivity uncertainty (see Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)
for more details). Whereas the identification of firm productivity only required two
consecutive wage observations, the maximum spell length of 36 months in the SIPP
now becomes more of on an issue. Therefore, we opt for a different calibration strategy.
We first regress out idiosyncratic wage components absent from our model (gender,
race, marriage and disability)31. We then choose σ2N to match initial wage inequality
and σ2 to match the increase in wage inequality over the life-cycle.
Lastly, an important part of wage fluctuations may actually be the result of
measurement error. We therefore explicitly model it in our baseline calibration. At
this point, we need to make further assumptions regarding its statistical properties.
Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we postulate a MA(q) process (i.e., ri,t =
Θ(q)ιi,t = ιi,t −∑qj=1 θjιi,t−j). Given that studies on annual wage growth typically
assume iid measurement error, we fix q at 12. Assuming E(obsi,t obsi,t−j) = 0 ∀j 6= 0, the
parameters Θ(12) and σι can be obtained using Maximum Likelihood estimation and
Kalman filtering32. Appendix 2.B.3 supplies further detail on the procedure.
31Wages in our model are a function of productivities. We purify our data of these effects, which are
well-known drivers of wages because we think they are inadequately represented by our model
set-up. Gender and race biases are likely the result more of discrimination than a representation
of productivity. Marriage stands in for a joint labor supply decision absent from our model as
we do not model joint intra-household decisions. Disability likely does represent productivity,
but not in a way adequately captured by our model.
32We thank Johannes Pfeifer for providing us with the Kalman filtering routine.
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2.5 Results
We now present the main results of this chapter. Section 2.5.1 demonstrates that
the frictional wage dispersion present in our model is of the size estimated in the data.
We then proceed to investigate the importance of the different channels in expanding
the range of job offers acceptable to the workers. We demonstrate that our process
for general human capital and the possibility to search on the job are both crucial
ingredients in allowing the model to match the data. Shutting down any of the three
channels: skill acquisition in employment, skill depreciation in unemployment or on
the job search significantly shrinks the set of acceptable job offers and consequently
frictional wage dispersion. Limited UI duration is only of second order importance.
Given our calibration target, a job-ladder model with initial worker heterogeneity
turns out to be a rival specification capable of producing empirically observed residual
dispersion. It largely overstates; however, the gains of on the job search by neglecting
the one third of job to job movements resulting in wage losses in the data.
In Section 2.5.2, we demonstrate that our model also produces a good represen-
tation of the empirical wage distribution. After discussing the structurally inferred
parameters of the wage offer distribution and of idiosyncratic wage uncertainty, we
determine the relative contributions of firm dispersion, productivity development and
the distribution of workers over firms to overall wage dispersion. Our results attribute
about 17.5 percent of wage inequality to the presence of the search friction. The on
the job search model, neglecting forced movements, yields a much larger contribution
of over 40 percent.
2.5.1 Frictional Wage Dispersion and its Causes
Frictional Wage Dispersion in the Baseline Specification
In our model, workers of identical idiosyncratic characteristics may be earning
different wages because they are employed with firms of different productivities, or
because of measurement error. When measuring frictional wages, the econometrician
would observe
ln(w˜i,t) = β3Γi,t + ri,t,
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where we again apply our approximated wage schedule from equation (2.1). All our
statistics regarding frictional wages in the model are based on this expression.
Table 2.4 compares the frictional wage dispersion in our model to the amount
of residual wage dispersion present in the data. Our model successfully reproduces
the amount of residual inequality. In the baseline specification, the mean residual
wage paid is 2.57 times the smallest observation. This is comparable, though slightly
larger, to the Mm-ratio of 2.18 when taking the first percentile in the data to be the
minimum wage. When looking at higher percentiles, model and data line up closely as
well. Also the other statistics look favorable: the Gini coefficient matches up almost
exactly and our model explains 84 percent of the variance of residual log wages in
the data. When comparing different model specifications in our subsequent analysis,
we only report changes in the Mm-ratio. This increases clarity of presentation and
facilitates comparison with other studies, foremost HKV themselves, that report
this summary statistic. When using percentiles as minimum wage, is also has the
advantage of being robust to classical measurement error.
Table 2.4: Frictional Wage Dispersion
Mean-Min Ratio Gini V ar(log(w˜it))
Model Data Model Data Model Data
Pctl.
Min 2.57
0.0894 0.091 0.026 0.0311
st 1.45 2.18
5th 1.38 1.48
10th 1.31 1.31
Notes: The table compares frictional wage dispersion generated by the baseline specification to resid-
ual wage dispersion in the 1993 SIPP. We report the Mm-ratio using the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile
as possible minimum wages. For comparability, we report the corresponding statistic in the data as
well.
Sources of Frictional Inequality
We now analyze how the details of our model specification interact with the range
of job offers acceptable to the worker given the distribution of firm productivities
in our baseline. Therefore, we resolve a number of restricted versions, each time
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excluding one of the main channels and recalibrating to the flow rates and the residual
wage profile. In each calibration, the unemployed sample at most one job offer per
month, which imposes an upper bound on the flow value of unemployment for one
of the experiments. Table 2.5 reports the resulting frictional wage dispersion and
replacement rates.
It turns out that the main driver behind our results is the interaction of our process
for general human capital with the possibility to search on the job. Specifications
A to C turn off each of those channels one after another. When setting expected
experience gains during employment to zero, the Mm-ratio falls to only 1.43. As
potential experience gains are equal in all firms, being employed at all becomes
much more important than in which firm specifically. The same argument applies
to the effects of skill depreciation, specification B, even though its effects are less
pronounced. When setting δ to zero, the Mm-ratio drops to 1.98, which is still sizable,
but a substantial decrease from 2.57. When denying workers the possibility to search
on the job, the Mm-ratio plummets to 1.19 and no positive replacement rates are
able to match observed flow rates. Finally, as demonstrated in specification D, the
limited payout duration of unemployment benefits is only of second order importance
to the empirical success of our model.
Table 2.5: Contributions to Frictional Wage Dispersion
Specification Mm-Ratio rrb + rrz
Baseline 2.57 0.4
A No learning on the job(ν(φ) = 0) 1.43 0.4
B No skill depreciation(δ = 0) 1.98 0.4
C No search on the job
λ = 0 1.19 0
D Infinite UI(λl = 0) 2.35 0.4
Notes: The table displays the mean-min ratio and the replacement rate for four
different model specifications that differ from our baseline model by some param-
eter restriction.
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We have stressed previously the importance of accounting for job to job transitions
resulting in wage losses when inferring search efficiencies from job to job flow rates.
In the absence of forced movements, we could generate any value for the Mm-ratio
as workers would accept even negative wages. There are two reasons for this: First,
when a job offer is a forced one, moving is almost always preferred to quitting into
unemployment. Second, forced job movements decrease the rate at which agents
climb up the productivity ladder of firms, making future job offers more likely to
be better than today’s offer. In consequence, search on the job is more efficient in
a model not featuring forced job movements. The value of employment increases
relative to the value of unemployment, which increases frictional wage dispersion.
A competing explanation
Our previous analysis identifies on the job search as an important channel in
understanding frictional wage dispersion. Indeed, one might ask how far a more
“standard” on the job search specification would go on its own in explaining the data
when calibrating it to observed flow rates only and ignoring forced movements. We
discuss such an experiment in this section. The combination of a job-ladder model with
heterogeneous initial worker productivities and general human capital uncertainty,
but no trend growth on and off the job, calibrated to our targets by itself yields
an Mm-ratio of 2.83 with solidly positive replacement rates33. Given our previous
estimates, this appears to be an empirically successful alternative explanation.
As discussed in Section 2.2.3; however, these model types largely overstate the
efficiency of on the job search by ignoring the frequent occurrence of job to job
transitions resulting in wage losses. We therefore take the ability to realistically
account for wage dynamics upon job to job movement as a means of discriminating
between these rival model specifications. Table 2.6 highlights the differences.
In the data, job to job movements result in wage gains of two percent on average.
Conditional on suffering a wage loss upon movement, workers lose 22 percent of
33Hornstein et al. (2011) also consider a job-ladder model and obtain Mm-ratios between 1.16 and
1.27 for a replacement rate of 0.4. However, the presence of individual productivity heterogeneity
in our model implies heterogeneous reservation wages. In consequence, the homogeneous job offer
arrival rate and the unemployment to employment flow rate are no longer identical. Moreover,
the stochastic productivity process implies a higher option value of employment because workers
can quit at any time into unemployment. These differences account in our case for the much
larger frictional wage dispersion.
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Table 2.6: Wage Changes from Job to Job Movements
Specification Avg. gain Avg. loss
Data 0.0203 -0.22
Baseline 0.069 -0.21
Job-Ladder model
ν(1) = ν(2) = 0 = δ λl = 0 0.26 -0.07
Notes: The table compares the model baseline specification with a pure on the
job search specification on their implications for job to job transitions. Statis-
tics are the resulting average wage gain upon job movement and the average
wage loss conditional on observing a loss. Data refers to computation from the
1993 SIPP for nominal wages.
their previous wages. Our baseline specification fares quite well in reproducing these
statistics. Wage gains are too high, but the order of magnitude is comparable. The
model does well in reproducing the large conditional wage losses. In the job-ladder
model, average wage gains of 26 percent are much too large compared to the data.
Since workers in this model only transit to more productive jobs, the wage losses are
only observed as result of a negative productivity shock or of measurement error. A
conditional seven percent average wage loss clearly fails in this respect. We come
back to this specification in Section 2.5.2 when discussing structural inference.
2.5.2 Wage Dispersion
Overall Wage Dispersion in the Model and in the Data
Confident of having established the main channels shaping frictional wage inequality,
we now use our calibrated baseline for structural inference regarding the sources of
wage inequality. So far, the literature has suggested a wide range of estimates regarding
the relative importance of differing initial abilities, σN , idiosyncratic productivity
uncertainty, σ, the search friction, σF , and a sorting term that we introduce below.
In order to assure that our model can be used to make such statements, we first
have to evaluate whether it reproduces a wage distribution comparable to what we see
in the data. As discussed previously, there are a few well-known wage determinants
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in the data that our model is not designed to include. In what follows; therefore, we
first regress log wages in our data on a constant and dummies for disability, gender,
marriage status and race. These factors account for 10 percent of log wage variation.
We compare our model’s wage distribution to the resulting distribution34. Figure III
plots the kernel estimator of the aggregate density function of wages against its model
counterpart after transforming the data back to levels35. It features the characteristic
right skew of the observed wage distribution in the data. Figure IV displays the
theoretical and empirical Lorenz curves of wages. Our model economy exhibits slightly
more wage inequality, but the difference is negligible. Overall, the results reassure us
that our model economy picks up the key moments of wage inequality present in the
data.
Figure III: Wage Distributions
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Figure IV: Lorenz Curves
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Notes: Figure III plots the PDF of workers over wages in the model against the data. In both cases, log
wages have been demeaned before transforming them back to levels and a kernel smoother has been applied.
Figure IV compares Lorenz curves. The straight line designates 1993 SIPP data and the dashed line refers
to the model.
Sources of Wage Inequality
We start by discussing the wage offer distribution and the distribution of idiosyn-
cratic wage risk. The first line of Table 2.7 displayes the results. Our estimate for√
β1σ implies an annual standard deviation for the permanent component of wages
34This should of course not be confused with the residual distribution we used as a measure for
frictional wage dispersion.
35We truncate our observed wage data at the bottom and top 1% wage observations to delete
outliers. We do the same adjustment to our simulated data in this section.
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Table 2.7: Wage Offer Distribution and Idiosyncratic Risk
Specification
√
β3σF
√
β1σ
Baseline 0.29 0.0180
Job-Ladder model
ν(1) = ν(2) = 0 = δ λl = 0 0.44 0.0156
Notes: The table displays the standard deviations of the wage offer distribu-
tion and of the idiosyncratic wage shock. The first line refers to the baseline
specification and the second one to a calibration of on the job search only.
of 0.0624. To put our results into perspective, Low et al. (2010), also using the 1993
SIPP, estimate a standard deviation for the wage offer distribution of 0.23 and of
0.103 for annual productivity innovations. Our estimates attribute more ex-ante
wage uncertainty to the firm component as opposed to idiosyncratic productivity
uncertainty.
To evaluate the contributions of idiosyncratic productivity innovations, firm dif-
ferences, and worker selection into matches, we simulate a panel of 15000 workers’
histories for 43 years. Consider the following variance decomposition based on a
slightly modified version of (2.1), which we estimate separately for each age group in
our simulated data:
V ar(ln(wi)) = β21V ar(Ai) + β22V ar(Γi) + 2β1β2Cov(Ai,Γi) + V ar(ri).
The left panel of Figure V displays the results. Measurement error does not appear
to be very important. Sorting of workers over firm productivities has a mild negative
effect. For young workers, firm heterogeneity explains more than forty percent of the
overall log wage variance, but that number quickly drops as workers’ employment
histories become more diverse. Our model identifies worker heterogeneity as the
dominant factor in explaining variations in wages and this effect is increasing in
age36. In a population weighted average, frictional wage dispersion accounts for 19.45
36Note that this finding is not in contrast to the fact that a Mincer wage equation with worker fixed
effects explains only little variation in wages. Individual productivity is only partially correlated
with initial productivity and all changes in productivity are time varying unobservables to the
econometrician. The typical worker observables included in the Mincer wage equation can at
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percent of wage inequality within our model. Given that we eliminated 10 percent of
wage variation through our fixed effect regression, this implies frictional inequality to
account for 17.5 percent of overall wage inequality present in our data.
Neglecting Wage Cuts in On the Job Search Models
The literature so far has produced a wide range of estimates regarding the contri-
bution of the search friction to overall inequality. Estimates range from 6 percent
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) to as high as 100 percent in Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002) for low skilled workers. Our estimate comes out in the lower part of
that spectrum. Using our model, we can show why on the job search models, like
the one estimated in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), are likely to produce higher
estimates for the contribution of frictional wage dispersion37. These models have so
far attributed all employment to employment transitions to upwards movements on
best proxy for these variations.
37The comparison to the results in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) is less straightforward. Their
approach has the advantage of not having to make distributional assumptions, whereas we have
to specify log-normality for the wage offer distributions. However, they need to assume that
endogenous quitting is absent and that innovations to wages are non-permanent. It is trivial to
show that using their estimation technique in our setting leads to a considerable reduction in
the estimated importance of search frictions.
Figure V: Contribution of Search Frictions to Overall Wage Dispersion Baseline vs.
Job-Ladder Model
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Notes: The graphs display the contribution of sorting (black area), firm effects (dark gray area), and
measurement error (medium gray area) to the variance of log wages conditional on age. The left panel is
from our baseline specification, the right panel results from a job-ladder model with idiosyncratic productivity
risk. The residual variance is resulting from dispersion in worker productivity.
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a wage ladder, at least in expectations. As argued above, this implicit assumption
overstates the efficiency of on the job search.
We perform the same structural decomposition for the job-ladder version of our
model. The result can be seen in the right panel of Figure V. The cross-sectional
average for the contribution of frictional wage dispersion more than doubles to about
45 percent (40 percent of wage variation in the data) with values as high as 50 percent
for the youngest workers and decreasing much slower over the life-cycle. The bottom
line in Table 2.7 tells a similar story. The calibrated standard deviation for the wage
offer distribution increases by over 50 percent while idiosyncratic wage uncertainty
drops by 15 percent. The two model versions tell rather different stories about the
sources of life-time wage inequality.
2.6 Conclusion
Structural estimation of search models has frequently been used to circumvent the
problem of finding instruments in quantifying sources of wage risk and inequality.
One empirical appeal in using a search structure for estimation is its theoretical
ability to rationalize the large amount of wage inequality that cannot be explained by
worker observables. The search friction makes looking for the best possible wage offer
costly and induces workers of identical characteristics to accept a range of different
job offers.
Yet, as Hornstein et al. (2011) point out in a recent contribution, it is a built-
in feature in many of the commonly used search frameworks that they can only
rationalize a small portion of the empirically observed residual inequality as frictional
inequality given reasonable parameter values for discount factor and replacement
rate. When using them in structural estimations on wage data, the researcher is
therefore bound to either obtain unreasonably low estimates for discount factor and
replacement rate or to fix them a priori and attribute most of wage inequality to
measurement error. In our view; however, this conclusion should be drawn from a
model that theoretically could account for the observed residual inequality.
In this chapter, we therefore build a rich structural model capable of rationalizing
empirically observed residual inequality as frictional while also estimating and includ-
ing measurement error. We trace out the different channels influencing the worker
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decision and conclude that idiosyncratic productivity development and on the job
search are the driving factors behind frictional inequality. Concerning the latter, we
argue that a model featuring job to job transitions needs be able to simultaneously
account for wage movements upon transition. In particular, it must also address the
one third of job switches which result in workers taking pay cuts. This feature allows
us to discriminate between our model and a more standard job-ladder model in terms
of their ability to best match the data.
It also leads us to make a second more general point regarding the structural
inference of sources of wage inequality. Job to job transitions in the data are large
and an obvious source of wage mobility. Yet, many on the job search models make
the implicit assumptions that outside offers on the job are only accepted when they
are associated with expected wage improvements. In order to rationalize the size of
worker flows, these models therefore end up with high estimated search efficiency.
When simultaneously inferring the wage offer distribution from wage volatility for job
switchers, these models are bound to exaggerate the importance of the search friction
in generating overall inequality. We find search-related inequality to be responsible for
17.5 percent of overall inequality. When inferring the same number from a job-ladder
model neglecting that job to job transitions frequently result in wage losses, it doubles
to more than 40 percent. This finding explains some of the higher estimates in the
literature regarding the importance of search frictions for wage inequality.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A Further Model Details
2.A.1 The Value of a Vacancy
Here, we supply the calculation of the value of a vacancy, which for reasons of
parsimony we excluded from the main text. To evaluate future profit prospects and
acceptance probabilities, the entrepreneur needs to know the stationary distribution
of the unemployed over productivity, benefit states and life cycle states. Moreover, he
needs to know the distribution of workers over their productivities, life cycle states
and other firms’ productivities. Summarizing the productivity states in s = (A,Γ),
the value of posting a vacancy V I is the expectation of firm value V Jx over productivity
and life cycle states, minus the vacancy posting costs ϕ:
V I = −ϕ+ βEt
{
q1x(s)q(θ)V Jx (s′) + q2x(s)
λ(1− λd)
v
V Jx (s′) + q3x(s)
λλd
v
V Jx (s′)
}
,
where q1x, q2x, q3x are the probabilities that a worker accepts the respective job offer
given that he is of type A and in life cycle x and the firm is of type Γ. These
probabilities are strictly increasing in Γ, as a more productive firm finds it easier to
attract workers. We set the continuation value of a vacancy to zero, which is true
in equilibrium, because of free entry into the market and our assumption that Γ is
redrawn after each contact.
2.A.2 Equilibrium Definition
A stationary equilibrium consists of
• Value functions for the employed, unemployed and the firm value.
• Free entry drives profits for newly posted vacancies to zero: V I = 0.
• Wages solve
max
wt
: {αlog(V Ex − V Ux,u1) + (1− α)log(V Jx )},
where α is the bargaining power of workers.
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• A policy function that is consistent with the value functions and that maps
worker productivity, firm productivity, benefit entitlement, and the life cycle
state into a decision, whether a match is formed or not.
• Stationary distributions of the employed and unemployed over worker produc-
tivities, employment states, life cycle states, benefit entitlement states and firm
productivities.
2.A.3 Model Timing
1. The employed workers negotiate a wage with their firm.
2. Production takes place.
3. Some unemployed transit from u1 to u2.
4. The employed and unemployed experience productivity transitions according
to their laws of motion.
5. Life cycle transitions take place. Agents die and are replaced.
6. Exogenous job destruction occurs. Agents becoming unemployed cannot search
for employment within this period.
7. On the job offers realize.
8. Employed agents decide whether to quit, and the unemployed with job offers
decide whether to accept the job.
2.B More on the Empirics of On the Job Search
2.B.1 Measuring Job to Job Flows
In order to assess the efficiency of search on the job, it is crucial to accurately
identify job to job transitions in the data. One of the biggest advantages in working
with SIPP data is that workers are asked to report an employment status for each
week of the reporting period separately. While a higher degree of time aggregation
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Table 2.8: Different Definitions of JTJ Flow Rates
JTJ1 JTJ2 JTJ3 JTJ4 CPS
1.87 1.68 2.45 1.11 2.82
Notes: The table shows percentage probabilities for job to job tran-
sitions based on SIPP data from end of 1992 to 1995. For reference
we also quote monthly averages from Fallick and Fleischman (2004)
for the years 1994-1995. We differentiate between four different mea-
sures of job to job transitions: JTJ1 identifies a job to job transi-
tion when a worker is employed at a different firm between two con-
secutive months. JTJ2 identifies a job to job transition when the
worker’s 2 digit occupation code changed between two consecutive
months. JTJ3 = JTJ1 ∪ JTJ2. JTJ4 = JTJ1 ∩ JTJ2.
may mask intermittent unemployment spells, we can identify any unemployment spell
lasting longer than one workweek.
In a given month, we count as employed someone who reports holding a job for
the entire month. This definition includes paid as well as unpaid absences as result
of vacations, illnesses or labor disputes. It does exclude; however, those who report
having been on layoff for at least a week. There is no standard definition for job to
job movements in empirical work. We therefore experiment with several different
definitions. Our first measure is analogous to the definition in Fallick and Fleischman
(2004) and equates job to job transitions with firm changes. We use a monthly
employer identifier based on company names created by Stinson (2003). We refer to
this definition by JTJ1. Given that a firm is a match in our model and given that
employees may transit between jobs within a given firm, we find it useful to somewhat
broaden the concept beyond employer id changes. For JTJ2 we therefore follow
Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) in identifying job to job movements by changes in
the two digit occupational code. Moreover, we define JTJ3 = JTJ1 ∪ JTJ2 and
JTJ4 = JTJ1 ∩ JTJ2.
Table 2.8 lists job to job flow rates based on the different definitions. For comparison,
we also report averages from monthly estimates for the years 1994 and 1995 taken
from Fallick and Fleischman (2004), who use CPS data. Identifying job to job
movements by employer changes or changes in the occupational code alone yields
roughly comparable flow sizes. However, only our broadest definition of job to job
employment transitions comes close to the magnitude found using CPS. In order to
ensure comparability of our results with studies based on CPS data and following
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the arguments made above, we calibrate our model baseline specification on the 2.45
percent based on definition JTJ3.
2.B.2 Wages and On the Job Search
We argue in this chapter that the magnitude of job to job flows in itself is insufficient
to evaluate the efficiency of on the job search. Instead, the question is how many
of these job changes actually yield higher wages for the worker. In this section, we
extend the analysis of the main text. We demonstrate that the results are mostly
unchanged when looking at different definitions of job to job transitions and different
data stratifications. Moreover, we compute the statistics in question for real wage
changes.
We obtain real wages by deflating nominal wages with the CPI. For the present
purpose and all subsequent exercises, we drop any person/month observation for
which we cannot determine an hourly wage. In addition, we drop observations without
industry identifier and job to job transitions which result in the individual holding
more than one job after transiting38.
Wage Gains from Employment Changes
First, we consider the mean change in log wages that results from a job to job
transition. Our results depend somewhat on whether we consider nominal or real
wage changes. Of course, the worker should only care about real wages in making his
decision. Meanwhile, an argument can be made that in the presence of some wage
rigidity, the worker expects a real wage loss on his current job as well and therefore
compares nominal wages. Table 2.9 shows mean nominal and real wage gains for our
different definitions of job to job movements.
Wage gains after a job to job transition average only to about two percent. As
shown in Table 2.9, this is because roughly thirty-four percent of these transitions
actually yield nominal wage losses. The figure increases to about fifty-two percent
when considering real wages. Wage losses are not just frequent, they are also sizable.
Conditional upon taking a cut after a job to job transition, losses average to twenty-
three percent for nominal and seventeen percent for real wages. Reassuringly, these
38An individual working two jobs simultaneously may have trouble correctly attributing hours
worked to the different jobs. This could potentially add noise to the data.
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Table 2.9: Aggregate Changes in Wages after Job to Job Transitions
Nominal Real
Mean Share loss Mean loss Mean Share loss Mean loss
JTJ1 0.0224 0.3444 -0.2362 0.0199 0.5386 -0.1534
JTJ2 0.0194 0.3738 -0.2343 0.0171 0.5147 -0.1725
JTJ3 0.0203 0.3390 -0.2200 0.0179 0.5386 -0.1409
JTJ4 0.0224 0.4046 -0.2660 0.0202 0.5 -0.2174
Notes: The table reports wage changes resulting from a job to job transition for real and nominal wages,
respectively. The statistics under consideration are: The average change in log wages, the share of workers
incurring a wage loss, and the average change in log wages, given that the observed change is a loss. We differ-
entiate between four different measures of job to job transitions: JTJ1 identifies a job to job transition when a
worker is employed at a different firm between two consecutive months. JTJ2 identifies a job to job transition
when the worker’s 2 digit occupation code changed between two consecutive months. JTJ3 = JTJ1 ∪ JTJ2.
JTJ4 = JTJ1 ∩ JTJ2.
figures are largely invariant to which definition we use. From now on, all statistics
reported are therefore based on JTJ3 only.
We also stratify our sample by different observable characteristics to show that
the phenomenon we just described is not driven by a specific population sub-group,
but is a key characteristic of the entire labor market. The results are summarized in
Table 2.10.
We first split our sample into different years. The willingness of workers to accept a
wage reduction upon transition might depend on the aggregate state of the economy.
In the years 1993 to 1995, the time of our sample, the US economy was gradually
moving out of the post-Gulf War I recession and unemployment was steadily falling
throughout the sample period. Still, as indicated in the first panel of Table 2.10, there
is now discernible time trend in the data. By 1995, unemployment had reached a
historic low, but workers still accepted a wage cut when making a job to job transition
about one third of the time.
Women are known to have less stable work relationships than men and might there-
fore be responsible for an overproportional share of loss making job to job transitions.
Nonetheless, in the data both sexes have an equal probability of experiencing a wage
cut after moving. The same holds for stratifications by age groups. Young workers
have a looser attachment to the labor market and may initially experiment with
different career paths or search for jobs with higher non-monetary benefits. But none
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Table 2.10: Share of Wage Cuts After Job to Job Transitions in Different
Subsamples
Nominal Real
Stratify by: Share loss Obs. Share loss Obs.
Year
1993 0.3301 4649 0.5468 4650
1994 0.3299 3892 0.5267 3889
1995 0.3638 2959 0.5431 2959
Sex
Male 0.3367 6351 0.5335 6347
Female 0.3421 5176 0.5449 5178
Age
23-30 0.3483 3659 0.5183 3658
31-50 0.3368 6470 0.5419 6468
51-65 0.3230 1398 0.5819 1399
Industry
Agriculture 0.3999 119 0.5719 119
Manufacturing 0.3173 4274 0.5241 4271
Trade 0.3550 3083 0.5434 3080
Services 0.3687 1287 0.5971 1287
Government 0.3379 2767 0.5259 2768
Income
Lowest 25% 0.2316 3125 0.4191 2958
25-75% 0.3514 5567 0.5541 5716
Top 25% 0.4428 2835 0.6409 2815
Tenure
Less than 6 months 0.352 4932 0.526 4932
6-12 months 0.304 170 0.523 170
1-3 years 0.296 410 0.537 410
3-10 years 0.296 694 0.577 694
10 and more years 0.334 640 0.605 640
Notes: The table shows the share of workers incurring a wage cut after a job to job transition for a number
of different sample stratifications. The column "Obs." reports the number of observed job to job transitions
in the specific sub sample. Due to different outlier identifications, this number does not need to match
exactly between the cases of nominal and real wages.
of these phenomena cause the youngest age group to experience markedly more job
to job transitions with wage losses.
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We try out three more relevant data subsets. The first concerns the industry
the worker moves to. Some industries may offer substantial non-monetary benefits
compared to others. Of course, this exercise is not only subject to selection issues, it
is also well-known that wages show industry differentials. In consequence, we should
be expecting to identify industry pairs where wages fall in expectations when moving
from one industry to the other. In order to have sufficiently many observations for
all subsamples, we group industries into four broad sectors using their three digit
industry codes: Agriculture, Manufacturing, Trade, Private Services, and Government.
There are notable differences between sectors. Still, the share of workers incurring a
wage cut after a job to job transition never falls below 31.73 percent.
We also stratify our sample by earnings. We split the main sample into its lowest
and highest quartile and the observations in-between. Again, we do not expect the
outcome to be random, because high wage earners are more likely to incur a loss when
they are forced to look for alternative employment. In a simple employment lottery,
where all workers sample wages from the same random distribution, the probability
of incurring a wage loss is an increasing function of the current wage. Nonetheless,
low wage earners are far from insulated to wage losses when switching jobs and even
in the lowest quartile, 23 percent of all job to job transitions result in nominal wage
losses.
Finally, we split the sample by tenure at the previous job. High tenured workers
are likely to have been in a good match previously. Therefore, observing a job to
job transition conditional on high tenure may suggest that the movement must have
been a forced one. Our data provides little support for this view. Workers with
more than 10 years of tenure have indeed somewhat higher probabilities to incur a
wage cut upon a job to job transition, but the differences are negligible. A possible
explanation is that the high match surplus makes it unlikely for the firm to exit the
market and hence the probability of a forced job movement decreases. Besides these
considerations, there are two major measurement issues with tenure in our data set.
First, the SIPP asks respondents about the starting date with a specific employer.
Hence, prior to the start of the observation period, tenure is solely employer and
not occupation specific. Second, of those employed at their first observation month,
almost 10% report to have zero tenure implying unreasonably high turnover rates at
a monthly frequency.
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Alternative Explanations
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006) propose an alternative
explanation for those wage losses. They lay out a model where wages can only be
renegotiated by mutual agreement, and the firm has all the bargaining power, in
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), or part of the bargaining power, in Cahuc et al.
(2006). Wage raises on the job occur as a result of counter-offers to bids by other
firms. They demonstrate that in such a framework workers will accept wage cuts upon
job to job transitions, if the option value of working at the other firm is sufficiently
high. Workers only move to firms more productive than their current employer and
very productive firms offer the potential of large future wage gains.
A testable implication of these types of models is that expected future wage growth
with the new employer should be an increasing function of the wage cut accepted.
The left panel of Figure VI plots cumulative wage growth with the new job against
the initial wage change for our population of job to job transitions. There is no
relationship between the initial wage change and consecutive wage growth. In the
right panel, we restrict the sample to agents whom we observe for at least two years
with their new job (This time, the initial wage cut is included in the sum). We again
find no evidence, that agents that accepted an initial wage cut are compensated by
Figure VI: Initial Wages Change and Subsequent Wage Growth
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Notes: The left panel plots cumulative wage growth in the months after a job to job movement against the
initial wage change, excluding the latter from the calculation. The figure was generated using all observed
job to job transitions. In the right panel, we only include job to job transitions where the worker was
subsequently observed for at least 24 months. The cumulation of wage growth now includes the initial
change upon transition.
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steeper wage profiles on the new job39.
2.B.3 Estimating the Measurement Error Process
To ensure that it is not measurement error that drives the fraction of agents
accepting wage cuts upon job to job transitions and in order to quantify its contribution
to observed (frictional) wage dispersion, we simulate our model with measurement
error. Recall that wages in the data are given by (2.2). To simulate our model with
the same measurement error process, we require estimates of Θ(12) and σι. We
obtain these by maximizing the sum of individual likelihoods of within job wage
growth in the data. More specifically, we treat ιi,t as unobserved state and obtain the
individual likelihood for wage growth of individual i from the following state space
representation:
git =

1
θ1 − 1
θ2 − θ1
θ3 − θ2
θ4 − θ3
θ5 − θ4
θ6 − θ5
θ7 − θ6
θ8 − θ7
θ9 − θ8
θ10 − θ9
θ11 − θ10
θ12 − θ11
−θ12

′
ρit + β1it
39A caveat in interpreting this finding should be mentioned. It is of course possible that the higher
expected wage increases lie further in the future than the two years we observe. Given that
Dustmann and Meghir (2005) find wage-tenure profiles to be basically flat after two years;
however, we find this not very likely.
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ρit+1 =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

ρit +

ιit+1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Our calibration imposes the following moment restriction: β21σ2 = 0.00032. Table
2.11 reports our estimation results.
2.C Numerical Algorithm
The numerical algorithm consists of two nested loops followed by simulations.
Codes are available on the authors’ webpages.
• We begin the algorithm by guessing a labor market tightness θ.
• Next, we guess the wage function and discretize the workers’ log productivity by
1500 grid points. We find 15 to be a non-binding upper bound. The distribution
of log firm productivities is discretized into 50 equi-likely grid points. The third
dimension of the wage function is the two life cycle states.
• Given the initial guesses, we can start the inner loop, which calculates the value
functions using value function iteration. Expectations regarding next period’s
idiosyncratic productivity are calculated using Gaussian quadrature with 10
nodes for evaluating the productivity innovations and cubic spline interpolation
between productivity grid points.
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Table 2.11: Estimates for Measure-
ment Error
Parameter Estimate
σι 0.0236
θ1 0.066
θ2 -0.4426
θ3 0.9846
θ4 0.0779
θ5 3.5932
θ6 2.7587
θ7 1.4039
θ8 1.3519
θ9 1.2144
θ10 -0.1461
θ11 -0.0096
θ12 0.4869
Notes: The table shows the estimation results for
the measurement error process. σι is the standard
deviation of the MA(12) process and θi the corre-
sponding coefficients.
• The value functions of the workers allow us to update the wage function. The
value of the firm is implied by Nash-Bargaining: V Jx (s) = 1−αα (V
E
x (s)− V Ux (s)).
For obtaining the expected value of the firm next period, we again use Gaussian
quadrature and spline interpolation. We then update policy functions.
• Solving the value of the firm function for wages yields the implied wage schedule
for each grid point (wcomputed). Wages are only determined by Nash-Bargaining
in equilibrium. However, worker heterogeneity implies that in equilibrium there
will be certain potential matches whose surplus is negative. In order to be able
to compute meaningful values of employment at these firms we set wages equal
productivity or, put differently, we set the firm value to zero. Afterwards, we
update wages by wnew = ρwinitial + (1− ρ)wcomputed until convergence. ρ is the
updating weight and we find 0.75 to work fine at the beginning and increase it
to 0.9 towards convergence.
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• Upon convergence, we calculate θ implied by the free entry condition. This
requires the stationary distributions of the employed and the unemployed. We
compute these by distribution function iteration, using the policy functions.
For the distribution function we use a finer grid for worker productivities of
5000 grid points. Using the results, we update θ until convergence.
• The last step are the simulations that employ the policy functions and equilib-
rium job offer rates. We use linear inter and extrapolation on the worker and
firm productivity grid40.
40We opt for linear interpolation at this step, as it considerably decreases the computational
burden and does not appear to alter the results compared to spline interpolation. Also, spline
extrapolation is known to be unreliable.
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Savings Behavior and Means-Tested
Programs
3.1 Introduction
In the US, several of the major income support programs pay benefits to households
conditional on their earnings and wealth being below certain thresholds. A recent
public debate surrounds the welfare consequences of asset means-testing. On the one
hand, asset means-testing allows for relatively high allotments for a given amount
of governmental expenditures; therefore, mitigates the financial constraints of poor
households1. Moreover, wealth reflects in part the households’ past history of luck in
the labor market. Hence, asset means-testing allows allocating the scarce resources
explicitly to those households that suffered a series of poor labor market outcomes and
are in need for the insurance. On the other hand, the insurance scheme provides strong
incentives to the households to hold little savings leading to substantial consumption
drops during periods with poor labor market outcomes. Furthermore, the benefit
scheme distorts saving decisions over the life-cycle leading to a reduction in retirement
savings2.
The main contribution of this chapter is to introduce the current US means-tested
income support programs into the standard incomplete markets model (SIM) and
evaluate the welfare consequences of the programs within the laboratory of the
structural model. I argue that asset means-testing income support decreases social
welfare compared to a program that pays unconditional benefits to low income
1Examples for arguments along this line are Ryan (2011) and Cowen (2008).
2Examples for arguments along this line are the Federal Government (2010) and The Retirement
Security Project (2007).
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households. Given the same amount of total governmental expenditures, an unborn
is willing to pay 0.31% of lifetime consumption to be under a regime without asset
means-testing. Especially households with low permanent labor market income suffer
from asset means-testing.
The welfare costs result from households failing to engage in full intertemporal
consumption smoothing. Means-testing induces savings of eligible households to
become flat in a range of the state space where they choose the maximum asset
position that still entitles them for the program. I show that this asset choice and
the minimum available asset choice are the only choices that are not characterized by
first order conditions. However, also choices that equate expected marginal utilities
across two periods are affected by the program. More specifically, I prove that the
savings function features discontinuous increases along the wealth state. Intuitively,
households are forward looking and expect with positive probability that they want to
participate in the program in the future; therefore, increase consumption already today
to have more intertemporal consumption smoothing. As a consequence, households
hold on average fewer savings than under a regime without asset means-testing. I show
that a significant fraction of low income households fails to build up sufficient savings
to sustain their current consumption levels during retirement. The average life-cycle
consumption profile becomes concave with a discontinuous decline at retirement,
a finding that is in line with the well-known retirement consumption puzzle. The
failure of low income households to smooth consumption over the life-cycle is the
main reason for the lower welfare under means-testing.
There is an additional, yet by an order of magnitude smaller, welfare cost implied
by means-testing. The reduced saving incentives of the asset poor lead to a relatively
high wealth inequality. This in turn translates into utility of consumption being
more unequally distributed under means-testing. The costs of consumption inequality
decrease conditional on a permanent income potential; however, between group
differences become larger leading to a net increase.
The paper most closely related to my work is a contribution by Hubbard et al.
(1995). They show that introducing an income floor at zero assets helps to understand
why a large fraction of low income households holds little precautionary savings
in the US. The income floor acts very similar to asset means-testing and inflicts
households with low life-time income to choose zero savings for a range of the asset
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space. While computationally attractive, approximating asset means-testing by an
income floor does not lend itself to welfare analysis because it implies an unreasonable
high amount of agents with zero assets in bad income states; therefore, exaggerates
the welfare costs from means-testing. My work is also related to a contribution by
Heer (2002), who explores the implications that the two tier German unemployment
system, which is partly means-tested, has on aggregate savings and inequality. He
shows that the program induces some agents to choose low levels of assets leading to
an increased wealth inequality. Recent contributions by Koehne and Kuhn (2012)
and Rendahl (2012) study the trade-off between additional insurance and moral-
hazard in search effort when unemployment insurance depends on assets. Their
focus is on differentiable benefit schemes and they do not study the savings decision
for retirement, which is the main driving force for welfare differences in my set-up.
My analytical results are closely related to Clausen and Strub (2012). They show
that a non-binding continuous choice always satisfies the first order conditions in a
mixed continuous discrete choice model. Households are never indifferent between
discrete choices, and the expected value function has hence only downward kinks.
My value function has the same properties, and I make use of their concept of sub
and super-differentiability in my proofs.
The chapter is structured in the following way. I briefly review current means-tested
programs in the US and describe how I choose to introduce them into the SIM .
The following section characterizes the solution to household behavior analytically,
provides intuition for the main novel mechanisms and explains their implications for
social welfare. Afterwards, I briefly introduce the data set I am using and discuss
calibration of the model. I then argue that the novel mechanisms of my model find
support from stylized facts in the data. Last, I conduct the welfare analysis and
conclude.
3.2 Introducing a Means-Tested Program
In this section, I introduce a means-tested program into the SIM that is intended
to mimic the US system. The next section briefly reviews the main US programs that
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place a limit on households’ income and savings3 4. I provide an overview about the
size of the programs, the benefits they provide and the eligibility criterion. For a more
detailed review see Moffitt (2003). I then argue that the programs are sufficiently
similar to treat them within a unified framework. Finally, I introduce my model and
explain how household behavior is affected by the program.
3.2.1 Means-Tested Programs is the US
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides households with
vouchers for food. The goal of the program is to make high quality nutrition food
available to low income households. A wide range of stores accepts these vouchers;
therefore, the in kind benefits are similar to actual cash payments to the household.
44.7 million individuals participated in the program, and total costs summed to 75.7
billion dollars in 2011. Households’ savings must typically not exceed $2000, but
housing property and car value are not counted to some degree in most states. The
gross monthly households’ income must not exceed 130% of poverty income, and
about 30% of net income is deducted from the allotment5. The program is expanded
by the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children.
Females who are pregnant or have children less than five years of age can apply.
8.96 million people received benefits in 2011 leading to total spending of 7.2 billion
dollars. The eligibility requirements for this program are less stringent than for the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, but it only provides food benefits for
the child.
The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program provides income support
to families with children under 19 years of age6. The program provides both cash
and in kind transfers. The latter serves basic needs such as child care, education and
transportation. A unique feature of the program is that it is designed to promote
labor force participation. Household members must either be working or prove to be
3All programs that I consider are initiated by the Federal Government. However, the Federal
Government only provides a general framework and caries part of the total costs. The individual
states are free to design the details of the legislation. Hence, eligibility criterion differ across
states, both concerning the level of allowed income and resources.
4The amount of benefits may also depend on the size of the household.
5Net income is gross income after some allowances.
6Some states want to promote "regular families", excluding teenage mothers who do not live with
their parents.
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actively searching for employment. The typical asset limit for households is $2000,
and most states allow a partial deduction for the vehicle value. Gross income may
typically not exceed 100% of poverty level, and allotments typically decrease based
upon the households’ net income. Total spending for this program totaled to 33.3
billion dollars in 2011.
The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program provides energy assistance to
eligible households. Eligibility is usually guaranteed when a household participates in
another welfare program. Total costs of this program are close to 4.48 billion dollars
in 2011.
The two major means-tested programs that are not included in my analysis are
Medicaid and subsidized housing. I do not have data regarding the amount of benefits
that households receive from these programs. Moreover, these programs are less
suitable as insurance against income shocks. Medicaid provides medical support for
eligible households in case of bad health. Housing benefits may take the form of
subsidized rents in state owned housing projects or in the private market. Eligibility
is not guaranteed, and the waiting lists can be extensive.
Henceforth, my analysis considers programs that provide either cash transfers or
in-kind benefits that are quick to access and serve everyday basic needs. Therefore, I
make the assumption that I can approximate these transfers by direct cash transfers
to households that consume a single good.
3.2.2 The Model
The economy is populated by a unit mass of households, each living for T periods.
During the first W periods, the household works in the market and retires with
certainty in period W + 1 living until period T . Once a household vanishes, he is
replaced by a newborn household. The household takes as given initial total assets
a1 and the laws of motion of the state variables. He chooses each period end of
period assets kt, which pay certain return from the world capital market (1+r). The
household maximizes the stream of isoelastic period utility U from consumption over
his lifetime:
max
kt
{ T∑
t=1
βt
c1−γt
1− γ
}
(3.1)
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s.t.
ct = at + wt − kt
at+1 = (1 + r)kt + F (kt, wt)
at+1 ≥ 0, ct ≥ 0
{a1, wt} given.
The law of motion of assets depends on the eligibility for the means-tested program.
F (kt, wt) is thought to capture the two main features outlined in Section 3.2.1, income
and asset means-testing:
F (kt, wt) =
0 if kt >
a¯
1+r ∪ wt > wtelig
S(wt) if kt ≤ a¯1+r ∩ wt ≤ wtelig
wtelig is the maximum amount of income a household may receive to still be eligible for
the program, which may depend on households’ age, and a¯ is the asset limit7. Several
points are worth mentioning about the way I model the means-tested program. First,
I allow households to borrow against end of period means-tested income. Second,
the SIM is nested within my model with F not being a function of kt. Third, I
assume that the government can perfectly observe savings kt. I argue in Appendix
3.B that the key mechanisms that I explain in Section 3.2.3 will prevail, if households
can hide a fixed amount of savings. Moreover, the results will be identical to the
present set-up for a substantial range of parameterization, if the technology for
hiding savings is probabilistic. Last, note that I omit any means of financing for
the governmental program, which is mainly to keep notation simple. Having labor
taxation to finance the program would leave my results practically unchanged because
there is no employment decision.
Households’ log period income is additive in a deterministic component (µt) and
a transitory component (ϕt). µt takes values from the discrete, ordered set with
entries µmt and m = {1, n}. The path of µt is given by a function F that depends
on the income potential drawn upon birth and time: µt = F(µ1, t). The transitory
7Some readers may want to compare my specification to the one put forward by Hubbard et al.
(1995). Abstracting from medical expenses that they have in their model, they specify F (kt, wt) =
max{0, C¯ − [(1 + r)kt + wt]} where C¯ is a guaranteed consumption floor. It is straightforward
to see that in this set-up all households participating in the program choose kt = 0.
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component follows an exogenous mean-zero, N − state Markov processes during
working life. The vector of values is denoted by ϕv. The elements of the transition
matrix, ΠW , are common among households:
piWj,k = prob[ϕt = ϕk|ϕt−1 = ϕj].
The process is intended to capture the uncertainty from changes in households’ labor
market earnings and possible incidences of unemployment. During retirement, the
household receives a constant fraction of his last gross income. The transition matrix
during retirement, ΠR, is simply the identity matrix with elements piR. Thus,
ln(wit+1(ϕt+1, µ1)) =
F(µ1, t+ 1) + Π
Wϕt if t ≤ W
ln(κ(wiW )) if t > W
Note the way I introduce retirement income. The part replacing income, κ(wiW ), is
paid unconditional on participating in the program. However, individual savings for
retirement in form of assets influence ones eligibility to the means-tested program.
The problem (3.1) satisfies Bellman’s principle of optimality; consequently, I can
write it recursively. The value function of a household currently in period t with asset
position at, permanent initial income potential µ1 and current transitory income ϕt
reads:
Vt(a, ϕ, µ1) = max
k∈Γ(a,w)
{(a+ w − k)1−γ
1− γ + βEt{Vt+1(φ(k), ϕ
′, µ1)}
}
(3.2)
φ(k) = (1 + r)k + F (k, w) (3.3)
log(w) = µ+ ϕ
µ′ = F(µ1, t+ 1)
ϕ′ =
Π
Wϕ if t ≤ W
ϕ if t > W
Γ(a, w) =
 a+ wφ(k) ≥ 0
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I refer to Γ(a, w) as feasibility correspondence, which is compact and continuous.
Note that Vt is a function of time indicated by the t subscript. To make the notation
more compact for the subsequent analysis, define conditional on ϕt = ϕk:
Et{Vt+1(φ(k), ϕ′, µ1)} = IW=1
N∑
j=1
piWk,jVt+1(φ(k), ϕj, µ1) + IR=1
N∑
j=1
piRk,jVt+1(φ(k), ϕj, µ1)
= Vt+1(φ(k), ϕ′, µ1),
where IW=1 and IR=1 are indicator functions that are one during working life and
retirement, respectively.
3.2.3 Characterizing the Value Function
This section characterizes Vt(a, ϕ, µ1) and optimal choices kt. It is crucial to
understand the effects means-testing has on optimal choices in order to understand
its welfare implications. I provide four main theorems that give conditions for first
order conditions to be optimal, and I show when households deviate from first order
conditions. Furthermore, I explain why household behavior is affected by the means-
tested regime even when first order conditions hold. I delegate all proofs to Appendix
3.A.
Let me begin by introducing some notation. Let kt(a, ϕ, µ1) be the optimal choice
for end of period assets induced by the vector (a, ϕ, µ1) in period t. Likewise, let
at+1(a, ϕ, µ1) be the optimal choice for next period assets. I cannot establish that
these correspondences are single valued for a range of the state space given the
problem stated in (3.2). I assume that the household chooses the larger kt when he
is indifferent between choices. Consequently, kt(a, ϕ, µ1) and at+1(a, ϕ, µ1) are indeed
unique and I refer to them as policy functions. At the end of this section, I show
why non-uniqueness can arise and argue that it is of little practical relevance. Let
me define Ssup = max{S(w)}. Last, I define the range with length  and center k0
as B(k0). For most of this section, my concerns are about the asset dimension as
income is exogenous to the household. Therefore, I sometimes fix ϕ and µ1 at some
(ϕ0, µ01).
Lemma 1: Vt(·, ϕ, µ1) is strictly increasing ∀ a.
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Note the importance of defining a as total assets, including S(wt) and defining kt as
the choice excluding S(wt). Defining the state as assets excluding S(wt) would lead to
a downward jump in Vt. The next Lemma establishes weak monotonicity of the pol-
icy kt(·, ϕ, µ1), which is a direct result from the strictly concave period utility function.
Lemma 2: kt(·, ϕ, µ1) is increasing.
I am now ready to establishes continuity of Vt(·, ϕ, µ1). Intuitively, optimal choices
imply that a small change in the asset position does not lead to large changes in the
value function, even though the law of motion of the endogenous state variable is not
continuous.
Lemma 3: Vt(·, ϕ, µ1) is continuous ∀ a.
The following Lemma establishes that the policy function is not strictly increasing
for agents with w0t ≤ wtelig. More specific, I show that for a range of (a, ϕ0, µ01)
the policy kt(a, ϕ0, µ01) is flat with choice kt = a¯1+r . The intuition is simple: The
Figure I: Policy Function in T − 1
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Notes: The figure displays the policy function of a household with state vector
(a, ϕ1, µ11) in period T − 1. Wages are such that the household is eligible to the
means-tested program.
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household has to weight the extra utility he gets from consumption smoothing against
the income loss he incurs from choosing kt > a¯1+r .
Lemma 4: kt(a, ϕ0, µ01) is not strictly increasing ∀w0t ≤ wtelig. More specific,
∃kt(a, ϕ0, µ01) ∈ B(k0t (a0, ϕ0, µ01)) with k0t = a¯1+r .
Figure I Panel A highlights this point graphically for period T − 1. The optimal
policy is to choose kT−1 = a¯1+r in a range of the asset state. Note that this behavior
inflicts a cost on social welfare. The social planner always prefers that each individual
household equates the expected marginal utility of consumption.
The next Lemma highlights a point already apparent in the figure. It is optimal to
choose kt > a¯1+r for a large enough. The economic intuition behind the result is that
the gains from consumption smoothing become larger than the income effect from
the forgone income for sufficiently high asset level.
Lemma 5: ∃a˜t(ϕ0, µ01) s.th. k˜t(a˜t, ϕ0, µ01) > a¯1+r ∀ a > a˜t(ϕ0, µ01).
Equipped with these Lemmas, I can state my main theorems that are about condi-
tions for first order conditions to be either necessary or sufficient. The first theorem
deals with the retirement period.
Theorem 1: Let t > W and w0t > wtelig. Then
∂Vt(·,ϕ0,µ01)
∂kt
exists and ∂Vt(·,ϕ
0,µ01)
∂kt
= 0
is sufficient for an optimum ∀ at+1(a, ϕ0, µ01) > 0 and ∀ t ∈ {W + 1, T}.
The result follows from the assumption that income is fixed during retirement.
Therefore, ∀ wW > wtelig choices cannot be disturbed in any period in the future. I need
some more notations before stating my second main theorem. Let (a˙s(ϕ0, µ01), ϕ0, µ01)
be the state vector in period s s.th. under no possible realization of the world
in t ∈ {s, T} the household wants to chooses kt ≤ a¯1+r . Thus, from today on, the
household chooses with certainty a policy that makes him never eligible to the transfer.
Theorem 2: Let a˙s(ϕ0, µ01) be defined as above. Then
∂Vs(·,ϕ0,µ01)
∂ks
exists and
∂Vs(·,ϕ0,µ01)
∂ks
= 0 is sufficient for an optimum ∀ as+1(a, ϕ0, µ01) > 0 and as > a˙s(ϕ0, µ01).
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Theorem 2 is a powerful result because it implies that the means-tested program
has no impact on optimal choices for sufficiently rich households. The next theorem
argues that for non-binding choices the same holds true when the asset state leads to
choices strictly less than a¯1+r .
Theorem 3: Let (a¨s(ϕ0, µ01), ϕ0, µ01) be the state vector in period s s.th. under
no possible realization of the world in t ∈ {s, T} the household chooses kt ≥ a¯1+r .
Consider all a s.th. as+1(a, ϕ0, µ01) > 0 and a ≤ a¨s(ϕ0, µ01). Then ∂Vs(·,ϕ
0,µ01)
∂ks
exists
and ∂Vs(·,ϕ
0,µ01)
∂ks
= 0 is a sufficient condition for a maximum.
My last theorem is concerned with choices that are to the right of a ≥ a˜t(ϕ0, µ01) but
to the left of a˙t(ϕ0, µ01). I argue that first order conditions are still necessary for an
optimum. The main issue in proving the result is that Vt(·, ϕ, µ1) is not differentiable
at all points in this range. I show the result by demonstrating that these points must
be downward kinks. Because these cannot be optimal choices, it follows that the
function is differentiable at all optimal choices. Standard variation arguments then
lead to the necessity of first order conditions.
Theorem 4: ∂Vt(·,ϕ
0,µ01)
∂kt
= 0 is a necessary condition for kt(a, ϕ0, µ01) to solve (3.2)
∀ a ≥ a˜t(ϕ0, µ01) and at+1(a, ϕ0, µ01) > 0.
Figure II Panel A shows the value and policy function of an eligible household in
period T − 1. One can see how an upward jump in the policy function translates
into a downward kink in the value function. To provide a better understanding for
the trade-off the household faces between the income effect and the consumption
smoothing effect, let me define the following function at (a˜T−1, ϕ0, µ01):
WT−1(KT−1, a˜T−1, ϕ0, µ01) = U(a˜T−1+w0t−KT−1)+βVT ((1+r)KT−1+F (KT−1, w0t ), ϕ′, µ01)
KT−1 ≤ a˜T−1 + w0t ,
the return function from different admissible strategies this period and following
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optimal policy next period. Obviously,
WT−1(KT−1, a˜T−1, ϕ0, µ01) ≤ VT−1(a˜T−1, ϕ0, µ01)
with equality at KT−1 = kT−1(a˜T−1, ϕ0, µ01). The function is depicted in Figure II,
Panel B. The first local maximum is the choice KT−1 = a¯1+r . Choices just above this
point lead to lower returns because the negative income effect dominates the addi-
tional consumption smoothing effect. Larger choices lead to additional consumption
smoothing gains, which are largest at the second local maximum, where (3.2) satisfies
the first order conditions.
The fact that households satisfy first order conditions to the right of a ≥ a˜t(ϕ0, µ01)
does not imply that their choices are not affected by the means-tested regime.
To see that point, note that the life-cycle dimension and stochastic income imply
that households possibly attach positive probability to a state where they want to
participate in the means-tested regime in the future. They adjust their savings
decisions already today to fulfill the asset requirements in that case.
Let me first elaborate on the role of the life-cycle dimension. Consider a household
in period T − 2 that has income w0t ≤ wtelig. Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 establish
Figure II: Value Function and Return Function
(A) Value Function in T − 1
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(B) Return Function in T − 1
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Notes: Panel A displays the policy and value function of a household with state vector (a, ϕ1, µ11) in period
T − 1. Wages are such that the household is eligible to the means-tested program. Panel B depicts the
return function in T − 1, i.e., the return from different admissible strategies in T − 1, KT−1, and following
optimal policy in T , for the same type of household.
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Figure III: Savings Behavior in T − 2
(A) Return Function in T − 2
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(B) Value and Policy Function in T − 2
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Notes: Panel A displays the return function in T − 2, i.e., the return from different admissible strategies in
T − 2, KT−2, and following optimal policy in T − 1 for an agent choosing between the left and right of a
non-differentiable point. Panel B displays the resulting value and policy function.
that the policy function has a flat part and ∃a˜T−2(ϕ0, µ01) s.th. k˜T−2(a˜T−2, ϕ0, µ01) >
a¯
1+r ∀ a > a˜T−2(ϕ0, µ01). Moreover, Theorem 4 establishes that the value function
has a downward kink at a˜T−2(ϕ0, µ01). Note that VT−1 has a downward kink at
a˜T−1(ϕ0, µ01), implying that the value function becomes steeper to the right of the
non-differentiability. Consider the point ˜˜aT−2(ϕ0, µ01) s.th. aT−1(˜˜aT−2(ϕ0, µ01)) >
a˜T−1(ϕ0, µ01). To understand the decision the household has to make, let me define
the following return function:
WT−2(KT−2, ˜˜aT−2(ϕ0, µ01), ϕ0, µ01) = U(˜˜aT−2(ϕ0, µ01) + w0t −KT−2)
+ βVT−1((1 + r)KT−2 + F (KT−2, ϕ0, µ01), ϕ′, µ01).
Figure III Panel A shows the two local maxima of the return function. The first
implies that the household satisfies the first order conditions by choosing to the
left of a˜T−1(ϕ0, µ01) and receives means-tested transfers at end of period T − 1. The
second local maximum satisfies the first order conditions by choosing to the right
of a˜T−1(ϕ0, µ01) and the household never participates in the means-tested program8.
The policy function makes a second jump at ˜˜aT−2(ϕ0, µ01), and the value function
8The figure highlights that non-uniqueness in kt can arise when the household is exactly indifferent
between choosing to the left and the right of a non-differentiability.
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Figure IV: Consumption Behavior
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Notes: The graph compares two consumption functions in T − 3 where in the one
state the agent has wage income such that he is eligible for the means-tested program
(straight line) and in the other he is not eligible (dashed line).
becomes non-differentiable at this point, which I highlight graphically in Panel B.
Uncertain income has a very similar effect, but households with w > wtelig also
become affected. These households place positive probability on becoming eligible for
means-testing in the future. Consequently, they adjust their savings behavior today
to have in expectations the most possible intertemporal consumption smoothing.
Note, this leads to a rapid increase in the number of non-differentiabilities in the
value function because any path of the state variables that makes the household at
any point in the future eligible to means-testing has to be considered.
Finally, Figure IV shows how the non-differentiabilities in the value function
translate into optimal consumption behavior. The calibration is such that agents are
not eligible for the program in the high income state, but they are eligible in the
low income state. Concerning the latter, the following behavior arises: In the left
most asset section, workers are borrowing constrained leading to a relatively steep
consumption rise (Not visible in the figure). Afterwards, decisions are characterized
by Theorem 3 implying that first order conditions hold, and the consumption profile
becomes flatter. Lemma 4 characterizes the following section where savings are
constant and all additional assets are consumed. The following three discontinuities
are induced by downward kinks in the value function. Therefore, the slope of the
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value function increases after each jump leading to an extra incentive to accumulate
assets and decrease consumption. Recall, Theorem 4 establishes that first order
conditions still hold in this section. Finally, Theorem 2 establishes sufficiency of first
order conditions in the last section, where behavior is identical to behavior in the
SIM .
3.3 Data Description, Sample Selection and
Calibration
This section introduces the data set I am using and explains my calibration strategy
for the model. Appendix 3.C provide a description of the numerical algorithm used
to solve the model.
3.3.1 Data Description
My analysis requires longitudinal household data on components of income, assets
and means-tested transfers. The dataset best meeting these requirements is the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a representative
sample of the non-institutionalized civilian US population maintained by the US
Census Bureau. I use the 1996 (1996-1999), 2001 (2001-2003) and 2004 (2004-2007)
samples, deflating all data with the CPI9. The SIPP provides monthly information
on income, transfers from different means-tested programs and household affiliation.
Moreover, it provides detailed information on different liabilities and asset holdings10
on a yearly basis.
The asset and liability information allow me to split them into short term, long
term and property value, such as housing and different kind of vehicles. My data
counterpart to households’ precautionary savings in the model is the sum of all assets
and liabilities the household has. Two problems arise with this measure. First, durable
goods should be counted as savings, but the data has only information on housing
and vehicles, inducing an underestimation of precautionary savings. Second, savings
9The 1996 panel oversamples households close to poverty. I use household weights provided by the
SIPP in all samples to correct for this issue.
10The 1996 sample provides four times data on assets and liabilities, the 2001 sample three times
and the 2006 panel twice.
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may not reflect precautionary saving motives or retirement saving decisions, but
necessary business equity that a household holds resulting from incomplete markets
for business financing. I drop all households holding business equity to account for
this latter concern.
My model is about behavior at the household level. I define a household as a group
of persons living at a common address11, and I define the head as the person in whose
name the place is owned or rented12. I aggregate income and asset data of head and
spouse to mimic the within household insurance present in the model. I assume that
a household enters the labor market with age 25 and his economical live ends with
8113. To focus on the part of the population that is affected by the means-tested
scheme, I drop all households that have average income in excess of four times the
federal poverty limit14.
3.3.2 Calibration
Table 3.1 summarizes the calibration. The decision period is one year. The agent
works for 43 years and lives in retirement for 15 more years. Consistent with Siegel
(2002), I set the yearly world interest rate at 4%. The ability of households to smooth
consumption across periods depends greatly on their asset holdings. Therefore, I use
the discount factor β to match the median wealth to income ratio, which is 2.2 in my
dataset. I set γ = 1.5.
The SIM is intended to capture consumption decisions given an exogenous income
process. I take as data counterpart earnings in the labor market and unemployment
compensation15. To estimate the income process, I restrict the sample to households
with prime aged heads (25 − 50). I postulate the following log income process for
11See the SIPP User Guide for detailed information about the definition of an address.
12I change the head of a household when the default head lives non-married in a household together
with his parents who have higher income and are younger than 67. Moreover, I define a new
household every time that the composition of the household changes.
13I drop observations where the household is school enrolled, or works as a family worker.
14Less than 1% of these households ever receive means-tested income in my sample.
15I aggregate earnings from all jobs that the individual holds and add "incidental earnings" and
sickness payments.
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Table 3.1: Calibration
Variable Target
r = 0.04 4% Yearly interest rate
β = 0.961 Median wealth to income ratio of 2.2
γ = 1.5
κ(wiW ) Distribution of retirement replacement rates
µ1 20,40,60,80% of initial income distribution
F(µ1, t) Age-income profile for two education groups
N = 5
ΠW , ϕ ρ = 0.94, σ2 = 0.022
λ1(·, ϕ, µ1) Density of asset holdings of 25 years old
wtelig 130% of poverty income during retirement and working life
a¯ = 9.64 2000$ in 2011
Notes: The left column states the calibrated variable with its value and the second states the relevant moment.
individual i in the data:
ln(wi,t) = φi + zi,t + ιi,t (3.4)
zi,t = ρzi,t−1 + i,t, (3.5)
where i,t ∼ N(0, σ2), ιi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ι ). In a first step, I obtain residuals (w˜i,t) from
regressing individual household log income on time dummies, two race dummies
(white, non-white), a gender dummy, a dummy for being disabled, age dummies, four
education dummies (less than high school, high school, some college, college) and an
interaction between education and age dummies, each using the head of the household.
The cross sectional dimension far exceeds the time dimension in my data set and
my panel is not balanced. Therefore, I opt to identify ρ and σ by matching cross
sectional moments of the age distribution, as in Storesletten et al. (2004), instead of
matching moments of the autocorrelation function. Note that cross sectional income
dispersion evolves over the life-cycle according to
V ar(ln(wi,t)) = σ2φ + σ2ι + σ2
t−1∑
s=0
ρ2s. (3.6)
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Figure V: Income Process
(A) Residual Income Dispersion
25 30 35 40 45 50
0.4
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
0.52
0.54
V
a
r
(l
o
g
(w˜
i,
t
))
,
V
a
r
(l
o
g
(w
i,
t
))
Age
 
 
Data
Theory
(B) Income Growth over the Life-cycle
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Notes: Panel A displays the cross sectional income dispersion over age from the data and the theoretical
moment (3.6) for the optimal choice of autocorrelation and variance of income shocks. Panel B shows the
estimated income growth of households over the life-cycle for four education groups. L HS: Less than high-
school, HS: High school diploma, S C: Some college, C: College Degree.
Source: SIPP (1996, 2001, 2004)
Hence, ρ controls the curvature of the profile and σ the increase over time. I match
these moments by minimizing the area between the theoretical moment (3.6) and the
income residuals estimated from my data:
min
ρ,σ
{ ∫ 50
25
∣∣∣∣V ar(ln(wi,t(ρ, σ)))− V ar(ln(w˜i,t))∣∣∣∣ }. (3.7)
Figure V Panel A plots the data and the resulting profile with ρ = 0.931 and
σ2 = 0.023.
Turning to the model, I use the Markov process with N = 5 states to match the
stochastic component of income. Following Tauchen (1986), I use the entries of
the vector of values and the transition matrix to match the moments of the AR(1)
process16. I allow households to have four different initial permanent income states,
µ1, and use these to match the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile of the income
distribution for those younger than 27 in their first month of observation. My reduced
form regression provides me with profiles for income growth over the life-cycle for each
education group. I approximate the profiles by a fourth order polynomial, impose
monotonicity and assume that income does not grow any longer after the age of 50.
16The reason for the relatively low number of income states is the computational burden.
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Figure V Panel B shows the resulting profiles. Households with a college degree
have higher initial income and more income growth over the life-cycle. All other
profiles are remarkably similar17. Households with a college degree compose 35% of
my population. Therefore, I opt to give the two high initial income states the income
growth profile of college graduates and the two lower states the profile of high school
graduates.
The amount of households’ savings for retirement, and hence their incentive to
participate in the means-tested program, depends on their replacement rate during
retirement. Retirement savings can be exempt from the means-test when they are
not readily available18. As a result, all promises obtained from social security, most
defined pension plans, and retirement plans managed by the employer (401k plans)
are not counted into the asset limit. However, individual retirement plans (IRA)
and retirement plans of the self-employed (KEOGH ) usually do count. Moreover,
401k plans are transferred under some conditions into an IRA account in the case of
unemployment19. Henceforth, I define retirement income as the sum of social security
income and pensions from former employers, unions or the government20. I exclude
from retirement income payments received from IRA and KEOGH accounts and
401k plans. I then compute the distribution of the retirement replacement rate in my
population and use κ(wiW ) to match this distribution. Appendix 3.D provides further
information on this procedure and provides the entire distribution.
Call the stationary distribution of agents with age t, λt(a, ϕ, µ1). I assume each age
state is populated by the same amount of agents, which leads to a unique stationary
distribution. I calibrate λ1(·, ϕ, µ1) to the unconditional density of wealth holdings of
those 25 years old without any distributional assumptions.
Next, I need to calibrate the parameters for the law of motion of the endogenous
state (S(wt), wtelig and a¯). I want to match the amount of insurance means-tested
programs provide on average to households. I discretize the income distribution into
17High school dropouts have a slightly higher intercept compared to those that complete high school.
This fact is likely resulting from dropouts having more labor market experience at age 25.
18The individual states have some freedom in determining which savings are readily available.
19The 2008 Farm Bill exempts all tax preferred retirement accounts from the means-test for SNAP
from October 2008 onwards. I find it unlikely that households in my data adjusted their savings
in anticipation of this bill given that retirement savings are long-term investment decisions.
20I define a household as retired when he has positive retirement income, is older than 61 and does
not receive income from the labor market.
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200 income bins and compute for each bin the average households’ means-tested
income for those that are non-retired and retired separately. I approximate these
schedules by a 4th order polynomial and impose monotonicity. I set wtelig = 133 during
working life, which is about 130% of poverty income for a four person household21. I
set wtelig 10% lower during retirement reflecting that the poverty income threshold is
lower during retirement. Figure VI Panel B displays the resulting schedule for the
income states under consideration22. To obtain S(wt), I interpolate the values from
the approximated schedules. Finally, I calibrate the maximum amount of savings to
$2000 in 2011 nominal value, which represents the cut-off for most of the programs
in place.
Figure VI: Means-Tested Income
(A) Working Life
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(B) Retirement Life
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Notes: Panel A displays the average means-tested income a household receives given his labor market income
percentile together with a monotonic, fourth order polynomial approximation to this schedule. Panel B
displays the same for retirement.
Source: SIPP (1996, 2001, 2004)
21There are a few households in the data that receive means-tested income with higher incomes.
These are either relatively large families, or live in a state with especially loose income testing.
22Average means-tested income start to increase for relatively rich households in the data during
retirement. I impose monotonicity, which is more closely in line with regulation and hence cannot
account for this fact.
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3.4 Comparing Implications of the Model with the
Data
The next section shows that changes in individual saving incentives induced by the
means-tested programs are key to understand the welfare implications of the program.
This section argues that these mechanisms are also present in the data. Moreover,
I provide whenever possible a comparison to the SIM for the moments of interest,
which gives some intuition to the factors driving the difference in welfare between an
asset means-tested and a non means-tested regime23.
Figure VII displays the share of households receiving means-tested income in the
model, the share of households that would be eligible for the program due to sufficient
low income and the share of households receiving any of the transfers outlined in
Section 3.2.1. The model almost matches the overall mean and does a good job in
matching the decreasing share over the working life. However, the model fails in two
respects. First, it predicts that the share decreases during working life discontinuously.
The low discrete state approximation to income is hence a limitation to my model.
Second, the share of households receiving means-tested transfers is increasing in the
model once retirement is reached, but is flat during retirement in the data. Certain
length of life and the abstraction from a bequest motive are the most likely reasons
for this variation.
Figure VIII shows that average consumption is hump-shaped in my model with
a discontinuous decline of 1.5% once retirement is reached. This drop increases to
more than 3% when considering the decline from the year before retirement to the
first year into retirement. The reason for the consumption drop is that a significant
portion of households holds few assets when entering retirement because they want
to participate in the means-tested program prior to it. When income drops due to
retirement, these agents must adjust consumption downwards. A large literature finds
that consumption drops substantially upon retirement, a finding often referred to
the "retirement consumption puzzle". In a recent study, Haider and Stephens (2007)
find an average 10% consumption drop upon retirement using expected retirement
age as an instrument. Hubbard et al. (1994), using PSID data, and Bernheim
23This section uses β to match the same wealth to income ratio in the SIM as in my baseline
model.
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Figure VII: Participation in the Means-tested Program
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Notes: The graph displays the faction of households that participates in means-tested
programs. Data refers to SIPP households that participate in any of the programs
outlined in Section 3.2.1. Model refers to the equilibrium distribution from my model.
The dotted line shows the fraction of households that has income below the eligibility
threshold in my model.
et al. (2001), using PSID and CEX data, show that wealth holdings are particularly
low for households with low retirement income, implying large consumption drops
for these households. I argue that my model features the same qualitative feature
in Section 3.5.1. On the contrary, households in the SIM are very successful in
smoothing consumption in the event of retirement. Note the implications for social
welfare. Households fail to equate marginal utilities under means-testing implying a
reduction in social welfare.
Panel B of Figure VIII shows the Lorenz curve of wealth in the data and the two
models24. Recall, the calibration assures that the models match mean asset holdings.
My baseline model does a good job in matching the inequality at the bottom of
the wealth distribution; however, it implies too little inequality at the top of the
distribution. My model implies that extremely rich households are nearly unaffected
by the means-tested program making me confident that the too little inequality at
the top has little impact on my welfare analysis25. Put differently, my model implies
reasonable amounts of self-insurance and retirement savings, both on average and in
24The wealth data is top truncated, leading to too little wealth inequality in the data.
25I discuss the individual policy functions and the transmission of means-testing to high wealth
states more thoroughly in Appendix 3.E.
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Figure VIII: Mean Consumption
(A) Average Consumption Profiles
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Notes: Panel A displays the average consumption profiles in the SIM and the baseline model over the
life-cycle. Panel B displays the Lorenz curve of wealth for the two models and the SIPP data.
the cross section; thus, allowing me to assess welfare consequences of means-testing.
The SIM implies much less wealth inequality at the bottom of the wealth distribution
and similar inequality at the top of the distribution.
3.5 Welfare Analysis
This section discusses the welfare implications of means-tested programs. I compare
the current regime to a regime without asset means-testing, which I simply refer to as
alternative regime. The model environment implies that full insurance is optimal from
a perspective of an unborn. Henceforth, I always keep the total value or resources
needed to finance the system constant. All other calibration parameters are left
unchanged. Put differently, I do not address the question whether the level of current
governmental spending is optimal, but ask whether an alternative insurance scheme
can increase social welfare given the same amount of expenditures. Furthermore, I
avoid redistribution between income states and keep total resources in retirement and
working life constant. I begin by comparing welfare across two economies in steady
state. Afterwards, I take transition dynamics from one steady state to the other into
account.
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3.5.1 Abolishing Means-Testing (Steady State)
In order to get a deeper understanding for the implications of means-testing on
welfare, it is instructive to first compare two economies in steady state. To avoid any
redistributional effects across income states, I compute for each vector (ϕt, µ1, t) the
amount of transfers that agents receive in this state, Bt(a, ϕt, µ1), under means-testing.
The alternative regime provides during working life and retirement for each state
(ϕ, µ1) the constant benefit streams (bW (ϕ, µ1),bR(ϕ, µ1)) that have the same net
present value as the streams received from means-testing:
W∑
t=1
∫ Bt(a, ϕt, µ1)dλt(a, ϕt, µ1)
(1 + r)t−1 =
∫
bW (ϕ, µ1)
W∑
t=1
dλˆt(a, ϕt, µ1)
(1 + r)t−1
T∑
t=W+1
∫ Bt(a, ϕt, µ1)dλt(a, ϕt, µ1)
(1 + r)t−1 =
∫
bR(ϕ, µ1)
T∑
t=W+1
dλˆt(a, ϕt, µ1)
(1 + r)t−1 ,
where λt(a, ϕ, µ1) and λˆt(a, ϕ, µ1) are the distribution functions of households with
age t scaled to one. There exists a trade-off from a welfare perspective because end
of period benefits are lower under the alternative regime and hence less insurance
is provided in the low income states. However, all agents in the low income states
benefit from the program. Moreover, the distortions of consumption behavior are
different across the two regimes.
Consumption over the Life-cycle
To understand the welfare implications, it is useful to understand how average
consumption over the life-cycle behaves in the two regimes compared to the un-
constrained social planner solution. The social planner, who can pool labor and
means-tested income from different agents, wants to provide full consumption in-
surance. Figure IX plots the solution over the life-cycle for the lowest and highest
permanent income state and compares it to the consumption profiles from the two
policy regimes. Average consumption profiles are too flat under the alternative regime
compared to the social planner solution. The reason is that households build up
precautionary savings against income uncertainty. Consequently, there is potential
for means-testing to increase welfare by providing more insurance in particularly bad
states of the world. However, average consumption turns out to be too high under
98
3.5 Welfare Analysis
Figure IX: Comparing Average Consumption Profiles
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Notes: The graph displays average consumption profiles for the lowest and highest permanent income states.
It displays the social planner solution (SP), the solution with means-testing and the solution in the regime
without asset means-testing.
means-testing in the low permanent income state initially and hence too low later in
life. Moreover, average consumption drops significantly in the low income state at
retirement under means-testing. Households choose a somewhat steeper profile under
means-testing in the highest permanent income state, but the profiles are almost
identical across the two regimes.
Quantifying Welfare Changes and Decomposing Effects
I express the welfare gain as fraction of lifetime consumption that makes the average
household of age s indifferent between the two regimes. To be more specific, denote
by ct(a, ϕ, µ1) the optimal consumption function of an agent under the regime with
the means-tested program and let cˆt(a, ϕ, µ1) be the corresponding function under
the alternative regime. Hence, I am interested in the ωUt that solves
∫
Et
T∑
s=t
βs−tU([1 + ωUs ]cs(a, ϕ, µ1))dλs(a, ϕ, µ1)
=
∫
Et
T∑
s=t
βs−tU(cˆs(a, ϕ, µ1))dλˆs(a, ϕ, µ1). (3.8)
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One can show that
ωUs =
∫ Vˆsdλˆs∫
Vsdλs
 11−γ − 1.
ωU1 measures the average willingness to pay of expected lifetime consumption of an
unborn to live under the alternative regime. Flodén (2001) shows how to decompose
the utilitarian welfare gain into gains from an increase in level consumption, gains from
reduced consumption uncertainty and gains from reduced consumption inequality in
an infinite horizon problem. I can perform the same decomposition for each cohort
with age s.
Denote by cˆt(a, ϕ, µ1) the expected mean consumption from period t to end of life
induced by the current state vector (a, ϕ, µ1). Define Cs as mean expected lifetime
consumption for a household with age s. Formally,
Cs =
∫
cˆs(a, ϕ, µ1)dλs.
The percentage increase in mean expected consumption between the two regimes for
each cohort with age s reads:
(1 + ωLs )Cs = Cˆs. (3.9)
Define by Vt(ct:T (a, ϕ, µ1)) the value function in period t given the state (a, ϕ, µ1),
expressed in the optimal consumption policy from period t onwards. Certainty
equivalent consumption for each point in the state space (c¯s(a, ϕ, µ1)) solves
Vs(c¯s(a, ϕ, µ1)) = Vs(cs:T (a, ϕ, µ1)).
Average certainty equivalent consumption of cohort s is then given by: C¯s =∫
c¯s(a, ϕ, µ1)dλs. I define now the costs of consumption uncertainty for each co-
hort s as the deviation from the value of mean expected consumption and certainty
equivalent consumption:
puncs = 1−
Vs(C¯s)
Vs(Cs)
 11−γ . (3.10)
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Similarly, I define the costs of consumption inequality as:
pinqs = 1−
∫ Vs(c¯s(a, ϕ, µ1))dλs
Vs(C¯s)
 11−γ .
I can express the welfare gains of decreased consumption uncertainty and decreased
consumption inequality that result from moving to the non-means-tested regime as:
ωuncs =
1− pˆuncs
1− puncs
− 1
ωinqs =
1− pˆinqs
1− pinqs − 1.
Similarly to Flodén (2001), I can decompose the total utilitarian welfare gain of each
cohort s:
ωUs = (1 + ωLs )(1 + ωuncs )(1 + ωinqs )− 1.
Before turning to the results, it is worth elaborating on the relationship of (3.9)
and (3.10). Consider a world where income uncertainty is exogenously reduced.
Households react by decreasing precautionary savings and move closer to the social
planner solution. The decrease in savings decreases life-time income, which would
show up as a negative level effect in (3.9). However, welfare would increase, because
the increase in (3.10) would outweigh the level effect.
Equipped with these considerations, I now turn to the welfare effects of abolishing
means-testing. Table 3.2 shows the result from the policy experiment. An unborn is
willing to give up 0.31% of life-time consumption in order to live under the alternative
regime, besides facing considerably higher costs of consumption uncertainty. Agents
that receive temporary low income but have high savings have little problem to keep
consumption stable. The higher allotment under the means-tested regime allows the
same for agents with low assets.
Wealth inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is higher under means-testing.
This has two reasons: First, there is a direct effect on income of asset rich households
to be more equal. There is also an effect arising from endogenous choices that is
already discussed by Heer (2002). Households select themselves into those holding
little wealth and participate in the means-tested program and those that hold more
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Table 3.2: Welfare Analysis
Means-tested Unconditional
Gini coefficient 0.58 0.52
Wealth income ratio 2.196 2.574
ωU1 0.31%
ωL1 1.08%
ωunc1 -0.84%
ωinq1 0.08%
Notes: The top panel displays the Gini coefficient of wealth and the mean wealth to income
ratio for the two model specifications. The second column refers to the baseline, means-tested
program and the third column to a program that pays benefits unconditionally to low income
states. The bottom panel shows the welfare gain of switching from the means-tested programs
to an unconditional program. ωU1 : utilitarian welfare gain, ωL1 : gain from consumption increase,
ωunc1 : gains from reduced consumption uncertainty, ω
inq
1 : gains from reduced consumption in-
equality.
wealth and do not participate. Reflecting this, households hold on average less
precautionary savings under the means-tested regime and the wealth to median
income ratio is lower than under the alternative regime. The increase in wealth
inequality translates into somewhat higher costs of consumption inequality.
The decrease in households’ savings over the life-cycle reduces lifetime income from
asset holdings. Thus, an unborn has significantly lower expected consumption under
the means-tested regime. The inflicted welfare costs outweigh the gains from reduced
consumption uncertainty.
My decomposition allows me to compare welfare in the two economies over the
life-cycle. Figure X shows the components of social welfare for each age. Expected
consumption is always higher under the alternative regime and the gains are increasing
over the life-cycle. Similarly, total welfare gains from moving to the alternative regime
are increasing over the life-cycle, even faster than the gains from expected consumption
increases. The reason is that the costs of increased consumption uncertainty decrease
until age 37 and turn into gains for agents close to retirement. The term "costs of
consumption uncertainty" may be confusing in this respect. Recall from (3.10) that I
define these costs as deviations of expected consumption from certainty equivalent
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Figure X: Decomposing Welfare Gains
(A) Consumption Level
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Notes: The figures display the welfare gain of switching from the means-tested programs to an uncondi-
tional program. Panel A shows conditional on cohort the utilitarian welfare gain, ωUs , and the gain from
higher average consumption, ωLs . Panel B displays the gains from the change in the costs of consumption
uncertainty, ωuncs , and the change in the costs of consumption inequality, ω
inq
s .
consumption. Figure IX shows that expected consumption drops discontinuously
at retirement. The means-tested program induces some agents to deviate from full
intertemporal consumption smoothing, which shows up as a cost of consumption
uncertainty. ωuncs is slightly positive during retirement for a similar reason. Agents
under the means-tested regime choose consumption profiles that deviate from full
intertemporal consumption smoothing to increase lifetime income. The gains of
reduced consumption inequality are increasing throughout the life-cycle.
Given my income process, it is obvious that conditional on any µ01
ωUs (µ01) = (1 + ωLs (µ01))(1 + ωuncs (µ01))(1 + ωinqs (µ01))− 1.
This allows me to analyze further which subpopulation loses most from means-
testing. Table 3.3 displays the total welfare change and its components for the
four different permanent income states. Households with expected low permanent
income are the ones suffering from means-testing. Recall from Figure IX that these
households are least smoothing consumption over the life-cycle. In fact, all other
groups have welfare gains from means-testing, but these are comparably small. Again,
Figure IX shows that higher income states find it easier to smooth consumption over
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Table 3.3: Welfare of Sub-Populations
µ1 = 88 µ1 = 127 µ1 = 170 µ1 = 227
ωU1 1.22% -0.21% −4 ∗ 10−3% 0
ωL1 6.65% 0.56% 2 ∗ 10−3% 0
ωunc1 -4.68% -0.66% −4 ∗ 10−3% 0
ωinq1 -0.44% -0.11% −2 ∗ 10−3% 0
Notes: The table displays different welfare components from moving to a non means-
tested regime for the four different permanent income states. ωU1 : utilitarian welfare gain,
ωL1 : gain from consumption increase, ωunc1 : gains from reduced consumption uncertainty,
ωinq1 : gains from reduced consumption inequality. Welfare changes for µ1 = 227 are nu-
merically not distinguishable from zero.
the life-cycle and the reduced costs of consumption uncertainty allow them to reduce
precautionary savings. Therefore, if the government could condition on permanent
income instead of overall income, it could increase social welfare by introducing it only
for high permanent income states. The costs of within-group consumption inequality
are lower under means-testing for all income groups. Hence, the higher costs of
consumption inequality are arising from an increase in between group consumption
inequality.
3.5.2 Abolishing Means-Testing (Transition Dynamics)
Section 3.5.1 shows that welfare is higher in a world without asset means-testing.
However, this does not directly imply that society is better off from abolishing
means-testing. Agents living under means-testing hold relatively little assets and the
asset poor receive less transfers under the alternative regime forcing them to lower
consumption. These temporary welfare costs may well outweigh the long-term gains
from abolishing means-testing.
For simplicity, I make the payment under the alternative regime age dependent in
this section. More specifically, again denote functions in the alternative regime by
"hat". I solve for the payment b(ϕt, µ1) s.th.∫
Bt(a, ϕt, µ1)dλt(a, ϕt, µ1) =
∫
bt(ϕt, µ1)dλˆt(a, ϕt, µ1).
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Households in my economy do not care about future generations. However, I assume
that a social planner incorporates the long-run effects that a policy change has on
future generations. More specifically, I assume that the social planner compares the
discounted sum of average willingness to pay from now to infinity. Let me expand
the state space by the time that a specific cohort is born B ∈ (0,∞): (a, ϕ, µt, B)
where I index the period in which the policy change occurs by B = 0. The discounted
sum of average willingness to pay (AWP) is the sum of the willingness to pay of the
currently living households, CL, and all future households, FL:
AWP =
(∫
Vˆ (·, ·, ·, 0)dλˆ(·, ·, ·, 0)∫
V (·, ·, ·, 0)dλ(·, ·, ·, 0)
) 1
1−γ
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
CL
+
∞∑
s=1
βs
(∫
Vˆ (·, ·, ·, s)dλˆ(·, ·, ·, 0)∫
V (·, ·, ·, s)dλ(·, ·, ·, s)
) 1
1−γ
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
FL
.
Because a change in the regime has no general equilibrium price effects this expression
simplifies to
AWP =
(∫
Vˆ (·, ·, ·, 0)dλˆ(·, ·, ·, 0)∫
V (·, ·, ·, 0)dλ(·, ·, ·, 0)
) 1
1−γ
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
CL
+
∞∑
s=1
βsωU1︸ ︷︷ ︸
FL
. (3.11)
Table 3.4: Welfare Component with
Transition Dynamics
CL FL
0.66% 0.35%
Notes: The table displays the welfare effects for a
change from the means-tested regime to a non means-
tested regime. CL: welfare effect on the currently living.
FL: welfare effects on all future living generations.
Table 3.4 shows the two components of (3.11). Both, the gain of the current
population and the gains of future generations are positive. This implies that a
change to a non-asset-based system is implementable, given appropriate transfers
among the current population.
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3.6 Conclusion
A prevailing feature in US income support programs is that they pay benefits to
households conditional on their earnings and wealth being below certain thresholds.
The common rationale behind asset means-testing is that the insurance scheme allows
targeting relatively high benefits to those households that are in most need for them.
Households with low assets are likely to have had a series of poor earnings outcomes,
and targeting benefits to these households has the potential to mitigate the adverse
effects of incomplete financial markets. This chapter introduces the current US
income support programs into an incomplete markets model and evaluates the welfare
consequences of the programs’ asset means-testing. Given total current expenditures,
social welfare would increase from abolishing the asset means-test. Comparing steady
states, an unborn is willing to pay 0.31% of lifetime consumption to be under a
regime without asset means-testing. The welfare gains remain present when taking
transition dynamics of the economy into account.
The welfare costs of asset means-testing arise from households altering their savings
decisions as a response to the insurance scheme. I show that the propensity to
consume out of wealth decreases discontinuously along the wealth state and converges
to the behavior of agents in a world without asset means-testing. Put differently,
asset poor households save relatively little under asset means-testing. Consequently,
households hold on average less precautionary savings and less savings for retirement.
The reason is that they either want to participate in the income support program
today and fulfill the eligibility requirements, or they expect to participate in it at
any point in the future; therefore, increase consumption already today to have more
intertemporal consumption smoothing.
This behavior leads to two major channels decreasing social welfare under asset
means-testing. First and most importantly, a significant fraction of households fails
to build up sufficient savings to retain their consumption levels during retirement.
Average consumption declines by more than 3% around retirement and keeps decreas-
ing throughout it. The decline in consumption is most pronounced for households
with low income potential, who have the strongest incentives to participate in the
program, inflicting a major cost to social welfare. In fact, the insurance scheme
increases welfare of households with high income potential, who have less trouble
to smooth consumption over the life-cycle, but the gains are negligible. Second,
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means-testing increases wealth dispersion, which increases the dispersion of utility
from consumption. Because the social welfare function is concave, this decreases
social welfare. However, this latter effect turns out to be small compared to the
welfare costs arising from the failure to smooth consumption intertemporally.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Let kjt (ajt , ϕ, µ1) be the optimal policy and let akt > a
j
t . By the
definition of Γ, I have Γj ⊂ Γk. Thus, kjt is an admissible policy for akt with strictly
larger current consume this period. Because U is increasing in current consumption
and kkt (akt , ϕ, µ1) maximizes Vt, V (ak, ϕ, µ1) > V (aj, ϕ, µ1).
Proof of Lemma 2: Let akt > a
j
t and hence Γj ⊂ Γk. Let kjt (ajt , ϕ, µ1) and it
follows that kjt is an admissible choice for (akt , ϕ, µ1). Assume the optimal policy for
state (akt , ϕ, µ1) is such that k
j
t > k
k
t . It directly follows that F (kkt ) ≥ F (kjt ).
First, assume they are equal. Because V (·, ϕ, µ1) is strictly increasing, I have
Vt+1(φ(kjt ), ϕ′, µ1) > Vt+1(φ(kkt ), ϕ′, µ1). Resulting from the concavity of U , kkt
cannot be optimal given the optimality of kjt . Assume now F (kkt ) > F (k
j
t ). Hence,
F (kjt ) = 0 and F (kkt ) = S(w0t ). This again contradicts the concavity of U because
the marginal gain from consuming more today are larger for the lower asset position.
Proof of Lemma 3: I proof that VT−1 is continuous. Once established, the same
logic carries through for all periods. Consider all a+T−1 s.th. kT−1(a+T−1, ϕ, µ1) > a¯1+r .
Then by Lemma 2 F (kT−1(a+T−1, ϕ, µ1)) = 0, and there exists a smallest point for
which this condition still holds, which I call aˆ+T−1. Moreover, both U and VT are
continuous (The continuity of VT follows trivially from the fact that VT (·, ϕ, µ1) is
continuous and φ(k) is a constant.). Therefore, I maximize a continuous function over
a continuous correspondence and by Berge’s theorem of the maximum the resulting
value function is continuous. By the same logic, I can establish continuity at all
points a−T−1 s.th. kT−1(a−T−1, ϕ, µ1) ≤ a¯1+r . Consequently, I only need to establish
continuity at the switching point. When VT−1(·, ϕ, µ1) would not be continuous,
it features either an upward or downward jump at aˆ+T−1. Due to Lemma 1, VT−1
cannot have a downward jump. Next, assume it would have an upward jump. Then
by the continuity of U , it must be that kT−1(aˆ+T−1 − , ϕ, µ1) > a¯1+r because such a
policy would bring the implied value arbitrary close to the upward jump. But this
contradicts the fact that aˆ+T−1 is the least such point.
108
3.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4: The proof goes by contradiction. Fix some w0t ≤ wtelig.
kt(at, ϕ0, µ01) would be strictly increasing when ∃ a tuple (aˆt − , ϕ0, µ01) s.th. kt(aˆt −
, ϕ0, µ01) = a¯1+r and ∀ the tuple (aˆt, ϕ0, µ01) leads to kt(aˆt, ϕ0, µ01) > a¯1+r . Moreover,
F (kt(aˆt − , ϕ0, µ01)) = S(w0t ) and F (kt(aˆt, ϕ0, µ01)) = 0. I now show that for this case
kt(aˆt, ϕ0, µ01) > a¯1+r cannot be an optimal policy ∀. The policy k˜t(aˆt, ϕ0, µ01) = a¯1+r
was preferred iff ∃ an  s.th.
U(aˆt + w0t − kt(aˆt, ϕ0, µ01))− U(aˆt + w0t − k˜t(aˆt, ϕ0, µ01) + )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< β[Vt+1((1 + r)[kt − ] + S(w0t ), ϕ′, µ01)− Vt+1((1 + r)kt, ϕ′, µ01)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
where the inequality on the right hand side comes from the fact that V is increasing
and S(w0t ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5: The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume ∀ at(ϕ0, µ01),
kt(at(ϕ0, µ01)) ≤ a¯1+r . For expositional reasons, I assume the equality holds. Moreover,
assume w0t ≤ wtelig. The result for all other w follow trivially. Now consider the
alternative policy k0t (a0t , ϕ0, µ01) = a¯+x1+r for some state (a
0
t , ϕ
0, µ01) and x > Ssup. This
alternative policy is better for some (a0t , ϕ0, µ01) iff the following inequality holds:
U(a0 + w0t −
a¯
1 + r )− U(a
0 + w0t −
a¯+ x
1 + r )︸ ︷︷ ︸
→ 0 for a0 large enough
< β[Vt+1(a¯+ x, ϕ′, µ01)− Vt+1(a¯+ S(w0t ), ϕ′, µ01)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
The convergence to 0 of the left hand side results from the concavity of U and the
inequality on the right hand side results from Lemma 1. The second part of the
Lemma results from the monotonicity of the policy function.
Proof of Theorem 1: Call a typical element from Γ(at, ϕ0, µ01) a˘t. By assumption
φ(kt(a˘t, ϕ0, µ01)) = (1 + r)kt(a˘t, ϕ0, µ01),
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which is a continuous function. Both, the feasibility correspondence and the law of
motion are concave. Moreover, the inside of (3.2) is just the sum of concave functions
and hence concave itself. Thus, Vt is concave in this range. To proof the Theorem, I
apply the Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) Lemma. Let k˘t(a˘t(ϕ0, µ01), ϕ0, µ01) solve
(3.2). Now define At ∈ B(a˘t) where  is chosen s.th. k˘t is still feasible ∀ At. Define
the function
W (At, ϕ0, µ01) = U(At + w0t − k˘t) + βVt+1((1 + r)k˘t, ϕ′, µ01).
Note thatW (·, ϕ0, µ01) is continuous and concave because U is continuous and concave
and βVt+1((1+r)k˘t, ϕ′, µ01) is a constant. It follows thatW (At, ϕ0, µ01) ≤ Vt(At, ϕ0, µ01)
with equality at a˘t ∈ At. Thus, the Benveniste and Scheinkman Lemma establishes
differentiability of Vt(At, ϕ0, µ01). Because the function is concave and by assumption
the borrowing constraint is slack, the first order conditions are sufficient for a maxi-
mum.
Proof of Theorem 2: By assumption F (kt(a˙s(ϕ0, µ01), ϕ0, µ01)) = 0 ∀ t ≥ s and by
Lemma 2 this holds ∀ as > a˙s(ϕ0, µ01). Call a typical element from this later set a˘t.
Thus, for a˘t:
φ(kt(a˘t)) = (1 + r)kt(a˘t),
which is a continuous function. Consequently, the same logic as in Theorem 1 applies.
Proof of Theorem 3: It is sufficient to show that Vt is concave. Then the result
follows by the same logic as in Theorem 1. Call the set of at satisfying the above con-
ditions At. Because kt(a, ϕ0, µ01) < a¯1+r I have that ∀ a ∈ At φ(kt) = (1 + r)kt+S(w0t ).
Moreover, by assumption for each induced as, φ(ks) = (1 + r)ks + S(w0t ) ∀ s > t.
Hence, φ(As) is a concave function and Vt+1 is just the sum of concave functions,
which is concave. Therefore, the function inside the max operator in (3.2) is concave
and the constraints are concave, assuring concavity of Vt(At, ϕ0, µ01).
Proof of Theorem 4: Theorem 2 establishes the result ∀ a˙s(ϕ0, µ01); hence, I focus
here on all other points. Clausen and Strub (2012) show that non-differentiable
points can be classified into upward, the function is not sub-differentiable, and
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downward kinks, the function is not superdifferentiable. As they demonstrate,
choosing kt at a downward kink cannot be optimal because the slope of Vt(·, ϕ0, µ01)
is increasing to the right. Therefore, it is sufficient for me to show that all points
of discontinuity of Vt(·, ϕ0, µ01) are downward kinks or equivalently that Vt is sub-
differentiable ∀ at ≥ a˜t(ϕ0, µ01). Following the notation of Clausen and Strub (2012),
call ∂DVt(a0, ϕ0, µ01) the sub-differentiable of Vt at a0:
∂DVt(a0, ϕ0, µ01) =
m ∈ < : lim sup∆a0→0−
{
Vt(a0 + ∆a0, ϕ0, µ01)− Vt(a0, ϕ0, µ01)
∆a0 } ≤ m
≤ lim inf
∆a0→0+
{Vt(a
0 + ∆a0, ϕ0, µ01)− Vt(a0, ϕ0, µ01)
∆a0
}. (3.12)
Vt(a0, ϕ0, µ01) is sub-differentiable at a0 iff ∂DVt(a0, ϕ0, µ01) is non-empty. Intuitively,
a function is sub-differentiable at a point when its slope approaching the point from
the right is larger than the slope approaching from the left.
I first argue that the upward jump in the policy function at a˜t(ϕ0, µ01) leads to Vt
being still sub-differentiable. For the ease of presentation, I omit the dependence of
a˜t on the exogenous state vector (ϕ0, µ01) from here on. Lemma 5 establishes that
kt(a˜t, ϕ0, µ01) = kt(a˜t − , ϕ0, µ01). Therefore, the first part of (3.12) simplifies to
lim sup
∆a˜t→0−
{
U(a˜t + ∆a˜t + w0t − kt)− U(a˜t + w0t − kt)
∆a˜t
}
. (3.13)
The second part of (3.12) becomes
lim inf
∆a˜t→0+
{
U(a˜t + ∆a˜t + w0t − kt(a˜t + ∆a˜t, ϕ0, µ01))
∆a˜t
− U(a˜t + w
0
t − kt(a˜t, ϕ0, µ01))
∆a˜t
+ β[Vt+1((1 + r)kt(a˜t + ∆a˜t, ϕ
0, µ01), ϕ′, µ01)
∆a˜t
]
− Vt+1((1 + r)kt(a˜t, ϕ
0, µ0), ϕ′, µ01)
∆a˜t
]
}
. (3.14)
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Because kt(a˜t + ∆a˜t, ϕ0, µ01) is optimal, it must be that
U(a˜t + ∆a˜t + w0t − kt(a˜t + ∆a˜t, ϕ0, µ01))
+ βVt+1((1 + r)kt(a˜t + ∆a˜t, ϕ0, µ01), ϕ′, µ01) ≥
U(a˜t + ∆a˜t + w0t − kt(a˜t, ϕ0, µ01)) + βVt+1((1 + r)kt(a˜t, ϕ0, µ01), ϕ′, µ01).
Together with the fact that kt(·, ϕ0, µ01) is weakly increasing and Vt+1(·, ϕ′, µ01) is
strictly increasing implies (3.14) ≥ (3.13) as was to be shown.
I still need to show that Vt is sub-differentiable, given that Vt+1 is sub-differentiable.
Clausen and Strub (2012) show that kinks do not cancel out under addition. Hence,
it is sufficient to show that the upper envelope of a sub-differentiable function is sub-
differentiable26. When V (·, ϕ0, µ0) is the upper envelope of some sub-differentiable
function, f(a,K), with Vt(a0, ϕ0, µ01) = f(a0, k):
f(a+ ∆a, k)− f(a, k) ≤ V (a0 + ∆a, ϕ0, µ01)− Vt(a0, ϕ0, µ01).
It follows that ∂Df ∈ ∂DVt(·, ϕ0, µ01) and consequently Vt(·, ϕ0, µ01) is sub-differentiable.
The desired result follows directly: All non-differentiable points cannot be a solution
to (3.1).
3.B Hidden Savings
This section relaxes the assumption that the government can perfectly observe
savings kt27. A full characterization of the household problem is beyond the aim
of this chapter. Instead, I provide intuition for some specifications of particular
interest. I first show that a specification where households can hide a fixed amount of
savings does not alter the main mechanisms of my model. I can construct examples
where savings behavior is significantly different from my baseline model when the
government observes hidden savings only with a certain probability. Nevertheless, a
significant range of parameterization implies the same household behavior as in my
baseline model even in that case.
26My proof follows their Lemma 4 where I replace the derivative with the sub-differential.
27The section uses notation and refers to results from Section 3.2.3 and I advise to read that section
first.
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Consider the following modification for the means-tested transfer:
F (kt, wt) =
0 with 1− P (kt) ∪ if wt > w
t
elig
S(wt) with P (kt) ∩ if wt ≤ wtelig
where 1− P (kt) is the probability that the government observes that the household
has savings exceeding a¯1+r . It is straightforward to see that the logics of Lemma 4
and Lemma 5 still apply ∀ P (kt) < 1. ∀ w0t ≤ wtelig the policy function is flat in a
range of the asset state and makes a jump at some a(ϕ0, µ01).
Consider now a special case where households can hide savings k`t. So P (kt) = 1 ∀
kt ≤ k`t and zero thereafter. In this simple case, the proofs from Section 3.2.3 still
apply. The only modification is that the flat region characterized by Lemma 4 and
the jump point characterized by Lemma 5 are to the right in the asset state compared
to my baseline model.
Now consider the general case with an arbitrary P (kt). It is obvious that I can find
a schedule s.th. the solution with hidden savings coincides exactly with the solution
of my main model. Crucial for this result is that P (kt) is sufficiently small close
to a˜t(ϕ0, µ01). To see this point take an extreme case where P (kt(·, ϕ0, µ01)) = 0.99
Figure XI: Policy with Hidden Savings
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Notes: Panel A displays the policy function of a household where the probability to successfully hide savings
below the point a˜t(ϕ1, µ11) is almost one and zero for all higher savings. For comparison, it also plots the
policy function from my baseline model. Panel B shows the policy function when the ability to hide savings
is decreasing slowly along the asset dimension.
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∀ a¯1+r < kt < a˜t(ϕ0, µ01) and P (kt(a˜t(ϕ0, µ01), ϕ0, µ01) + ) = 0. Figure XI Panel A
plots the policy function in T − 1 together with the policy function from my baseline
model. Note that the region characterized by Lemma 4 becomes quite small because
taking the risk of increasing savings becomes attractive quickly. Moreover, the
policy function becomes flat in a second region of the asset state. Agents choose the
maximum savings that have positive probability of not being detected in this region.
To get an intuition for the robustness of my results to a more general specification of
hidden savings, consider the following parameterization:
P (kt) =
1 if kt ≤
a¯
1+r
max(1− kt−
a¯
1+r
α
, 0) if kt > a¯1+r
α controls the ability of the government to accurately observe savings. My baseline
model is the limit case with α → 0. Figure XI Panel B plots the value and policy
function of an eligible household in T − 1 for two different values of α. With α = 22.3
the households attach positive probability of successfully hiding assets in the range
9.3 ≤ kT−1 ≤ 31.5 and the resulting policy function is identical to my baseline model.
The range expands to 9.3 ≤ kT−1 ≤ 37.1 with α = 27.8 and households policy starts
to deviate slightly from my baseline specification.
3.C Numerical Algorithm
My algorithm differs markedly between retirement and working life. Consider first
the case during retirement, where I allow for off grid choices. This raises the issue
of finding maxima. My theoretical results show under simply verifiable conditions
that kt = a¯1+r is the only non-binding choice that does not satisfy the first order
conditions. Hence, the optimal choice satisfying the first order conditions can be
simply compared to kt = a¯1+r . Recall from Figure III Panel B that the return function
is not strictly concave over the asset grid. However, it is strictly concave between all
non-differentiable points in Vt+1, which are known when computing Vt. Therefore,
using standard maximum search algorithms, I can find the local maximum between all
non-differentiable points and compare them. The choice associated with the highest
value solves (3.2). Golden section search is a standard algorithm to perform this task.
The numerical burden is still large, as there are easily more than 100 discontinuities
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making it necessary to solve for 101 possible candidates. Therefore, I employ the
endogenous grid point method developed by Caroll (2006) to find the candidate
points.
Recall, uncertain income increases the number of non-differentiabilities quickly
making it computationally extremely expensive to allow for off-grid choices. As a
compromise, I allow during working life only for on-grid choices given the value and
policy function from retirement. Normalized Euler errors increase by a factor of
around 1000 compared to the more exact computation during retirement, but they
are still in an admissible range around 10−3.
3.D Computing Retirement Replacement Rates
This section provides further information on the way I compute the retirement
replacement rate. To have a more homogeneous group of agents, I further restrict
households’ age for this analysis. I define a household as working when head or spouse
report to be in the labor force, have income from the labor market in any month
during the observation period, the head is between 55 and 61 and neither head, nor
spouse receive social security income. I define a household as retired in the data when
head and spouse report to be out of the labor force, have no income from the labor
market, the head is above 65 and head or spouse receive some social security income
during any month of the observation period. I calculate the distribution of income in
both subpopulations and compute the replacement rate at each point in the income
distribution. Figure XII displays the result for the range of incomes that I consider
in my model.
Retirement income replaces between 57 and 39% of working income and is downward
sloping in income. The reason is foremost that social security replaces relatively little
income for the income rich. I obtain κ(wiW ) for each income state by interpolating on
the retirement replacement rate schedule.
3.E Individual Policy Functions
This section looks at the individual saving decisions that lead to the aggregate
dispersion in wealth. Let gt(at, ϕ, µ1) denote the growth given the state vector
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Figure XII: Retirement replacement rate
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Notes: The graph displays the replacement rate provided by retirement income con-
ditional on income during working-life.
[at, ϕ, µ1]. Figure XIII displays the functions under means-testing and in the SIM .
Let me first discuss the mechanisms that are inherent to the SIM . Asset growth
is an increasing function of wealth early in life, because agents want to build up
precautionary savings. As agents age, it becomes increasing unlikely that future
income changes. Moreover, the saving for retirement motive starts to dominate,
inducing a downward sloping relationship for all income states. Note that the
conditional asset growth becomes almost flat very quickly.
In contrast, the model with means-testing behaves very differently, especially
for young and poor households. After an initial drop, the decreasing propensity
to consume out of wealth leads to an increasing conditional asset growth for the
low income households and the medium income households at young ages. Saving
decisions for high income households are almost undistorted, reflecting that these
households have little incentive to participate in the means-tested program.
116
Figure XIII: Comparing Asset Growth across Models
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(B) Low Income, before Retirement
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(C) Medium Income, Newborn
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(D) Medium Income, before Retire-
ment
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(E) High Income, Newborn
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(F) High Income, before Retirement
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Notes: The figures display asset growth in the SIM and the model with means-testing (MT) for workers in
their first year and in the last year before retirement and for different permanent income states.
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